There has been all sorts of new methods to connect to
one another via amateur radio. Not ALL of them actually
involve a radio. Things like EchoLink and such, or the
big (for rent) "killer contesting stations."

Earlier this month, the North TX ARES people held an
exercise to pass traffic via radio only.

Not a bad idea to make sure the "no bells and whistles"
methods still work for when things like this happen.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/10/20/how-a-dumb-software-glitch-kept-6600-calls-from-getting-to-911/


--
Jeff-1.0
wa6fwi
http://www.foxsmercantile.com

On Thu, 23 Oct 2014 10:28:21 EDT, Foxs Mercantile
wrote:

http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/10/20/how-a-dumb-software-glitch-kept-6600-calls-from-getting-to-911/

Serves 'em right. That only affected wireless (and cable/VoIP) 9-1-1
access.

Showed two glaring errors -- the E9-1-1 PSAPs should never have
contracted it out to a single-source third party (or any third party,
at that), and the public never shudda' dumped their the wired
telephones because they now had a whiz-band transceiver called a
cell/smart phone. Not too smart in my book.

Notice that ham radio was NOT activated to cover the outage. Was it
on purpose? The decision is left to the reader.

Phil Kane
Beaverton, OR

On 10/23/2014 1:47 PM, Phil Kane wrote:
Serves 'em right. That only affected wireless (and cable/VoIP)
9-1-1 access.

You are aware of the numbers we're talking about?

There are roughly 118 million households in the US (as of 2009.)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_number_of_households
And there are roughly 20% of those without landline service to
their house.
http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/story?id=7521323

So, let's see, 20% of 118 million is 23.6 million people that you're
saying do not deserve 9-1-1 service?

Or am I reading that wrong?

Showed two glaring errors -- the E9-1-1 PSAPs should never have
contracted it out to a single-source third party (or any third
party, at that),

Well, this is just you're typical profit driven outsourcing model.
Admittedly, I would prefer certain aspects of our public safety
were done with the idea of getting it right, rather than cost.

and the public never shudda' dumped their the wired telephones
because they now had a whiz-band transceiver called a cell/smart
phone. Not too smart in my book.

Why should they pay for two services when one of them is tethered
to the house? The other is fully mobile and does a wee bit more than
just make phone calls.

Notice that ham radio was NOT activated to cover the outage. Was
it on purpose? The decision is left to the reader.

Actually, I'd like your answer for that.
How is someone with a cell phone supposed to contact an amateur
radio operator? Even if they knew that was what was required?
Or where would the amateurs be deployed and in what fashion?



--
Jeff-1.0
wa6fwi
http://www.foxsmercantile.com

On Thu, 23 Oct 2014 18:42:56 EDT, Foxs Mercantile
wrote:

Notice that ham radio was NOT activated to cover the outage. Was
it on purpose? The decision is left to the reader.

Actually, I'd like your answer for that.

Activation of EmComm, whether it's called ARES/RACES, ACS, or
otherwise, is at the discretion of the local government's Emergency
Manager - we do not self-activate. If the EM does not feel that s/he
needs our assistance, it's their decision.

How is someone with a cell phone supposed to contact an amateur
radio operator? Even if they knew that was what was required?
Or where would the amateurs be deployed and in what fashion?

The usual activation is to serve as a "bridge" between the PSAP and
the responding agencies and/or the Wire Centers (new name for Central
Offices) per pre-prepared arrangements. Message traffic can be
tactical voice or data.

Bottom line -- It's the responsibility of the carriers to get the
calls to the PSAP and they sure dropped the ball. IIRC there was
backup routing available via Miami FL -- that means a 9-1-1 call went
from a resident in Washington to the local carrier, thence to the
computer in Colorado thence to Florida and then ping-ponged back to
the appropriate PSAP in Washington. Granted it takes milliseconds,
but there are too many vulnerable links as compared to direct routing
from the carrier to the PSAP. The main problem was that the "overload
alarm" at the Colorado center did not kick in until an hour after the
problem hit.

The report is about 150 pages long. If you have problems falling
asleep, get it and read it. You'll be cured.

73 de K2ASP - Phil Kane

From a Clearing in the Silicon Forest
Beaverton (Washington County) Oregon

On 10/23/2014 10:09 PM, Phil Kane wrote:
Activation of EmComm, whether it's called ARES/RACES, ACS,
or otherwise, is at the discretion of the local government's
Emergency Manager - we do not self-activate. If the EM does
not feel that s/he needs our assistance, it's their decision.

And

The usual activation is to serve as a "bridge" between the
PSAP and the responding agencies and/or the Wire Centers (new
name for Central Offices) per pre-prepared arrangements.
Message traffic can be tactical voice or data.

So from just a logistic standpoint, how many amateurs would
have been required to bridge 11 million customers? And where
would they be deployed? The article mentioned this affecting
81 call centers. And how many responding agencies/wire centers
are served by each PSAP? Wouldn't that require at least one
amateur at the PSAP and one more at each served end point?

How rapidly could they be deployed?
Based on the article, I doubt the problem persisted for more
than eight hours. Certainly less than one whole day.

And course, there's the liability issue. Hypothetically, how
many lawyers would be involved if just one amateur dropped the
ball? Or even if they did everything right, and something bad
happened anyway.



--
Jeff-1.0
wa6fwi
http://www.foxsmercantile.com

On Fri, 24 Oct 2014 12:31:02 EDT, Foxs Mercantile
wrote:

So from just a logistic standpoint, how many amateurs would
have been required to bridge 11 million customers?

Do not assume that all 11 million customers would be calling 9-1-1 at
the same time. The public relations value of saying "11 million
customers were stranded" is worth its weight in gold when pointing the
finger.

And where would they be deployed?

That's up to the Emergency Manager - that's why s/he's paid the big
(taxpayer) bucks. In reality that would all be in accordance with a
"continuity of operations" plan jointly developed by the EM and the
carriers. That's where the ball fell down, to coin a phrase, not in
the links from the PSAP to the responding agencies, which are the EM's
responsibility. The "intervening cause" (to use a phrase from tort
law) blurs any bright lines of responsibility.

The article mentioned this affecting
81 call centers. And how many responding agencies/wire centers
are served by each PSAP? Wouldn't that require at least one
amateur at the PSAP and one more at each served end point?

Yep, that's how we are "billeted", but that was not the situation at
hand. The situation at hand was the breakdown in the Rube Goldberg
approach to 9-1-1 call routing.

How rapidly could they be deployed?

If the roads are open, how fast can I drive from home to the hospital?
(No more than ten minutes usually).

Based on the article, I doubt the problem persisted for more
than eight hours. Certainly less than one whole day.

It shouldn't have happened at all, is what I'm saying. The "alternate
routing" should have kicked in seamlessly. When I was doing FCC
communications we had no-notice drills of that constantly, including
"the Telco circuits are down, use the HF circuits". Surely Verizon
Wireless et al could do the same sort of exercises.

Best of all, the 9-1-1 traffic from the initial wire center should
have gone to the PSAP directly, but that's a dead horse it seems.

And course, there's the liability issue. Hypothetically, how
many lawyers would be involved if just one amateur dropped the
ball? Or even if they did everything right, and something bad
happened anyway.

When activated, we are covered by the same governmental immunity that
public safety personnel are. The old "Western Union" rule applies -
we are obligated to receive the traffic with no guarantee of eventual
delivery. In plain language - you get what you get.

73 de K2ASP - Phil Kane

From a Clearing in the Silicon Forest
Beaverton (Washington County) Oregon

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

In Foxs Mercantile writes:

On 10/23/2014 10:09 PM, Phil Kane wrote:
Activation of EmComm, whether it's called ARES/RACES, ACS,
or otherwise, is at the discretion of the local government's
Emergency Manager - we do not self-activate. If the EM does
not feel that s/he needs our assistance, it's their decision.

And

The usual activation is to serve as a "bridge" between the
PSAP and the responding agencies and/or the Wire Centers (new
name for Central Offices) per pre-prepared arrangements.
Message traffic can be tactical voice or data.

So from just a logistic standpoint, how many amateurs would
have been required to bridge 11 million customers? And where
would they be deployed? The article mentioned this affecting
81 call centers. And how many responding agencies/wire centers
are served by each PSAP? Wouldn't that require at least one
amateur at the PSAP and one more at each served end point?

How rapidly could they be deployed?
Based on the article, I doubt the problem persisted for more
than eight hours. Certainly less than one whole day.

And course, there's the liability issue. Hypothetically, how
many lawyers would be involved if just one amateur dropped the
ball? Or even if they did everything right, and something bad
happened anyway.



--
Jeff-1.0
wa6fwi
http://www.foxsmercantile.com


Can't speak for supporting a community of 11 million customers.
However, we know from past recent experience that it is workable for a
community of about 400,000 (Lincoln, Nebraska and surrounding 12
counties). Windstream (nee Lincoln Telephone Company, nee Alltel) saw
their E911 system go down on two separate occasions.

A write-up of one of the incidents may be found at:

http://www.arrl.org/news/telephone-o...il-fool-s-joke

Some of the highlights:

- Amateur radio operators were deployed very quickly and provided
meaningful support during the morning-to-evening outage (about 12
hours or so).

- The 62 volunteers that deployed followed a previously written,
practiced, and activated (on a smaller scale) "Y2K" plan, deploying
to 15 high-profile locations at intersections in the city of Lincoln
at the direction of the Lancaster County Emergency Management
Director and supported by the County's Emergency Operations Center
(EOC).

- As part of the contingency plan, those in need of emergency services
could also go to the nearest police or fire station if practical, so
amateur radio served in an assistive, not substitute, role.

- Citizens were made aware of these contingency plans, and where to go
to make emergency reports, via all electronic media (radio,
television, and Internet).

- The use of trained volunteers, in coordination with the county
government, minimized potential liability. Such plans, admittedly,
seem to be more workable in smaller communities, and in a state like
Nebraska, which is a "contributory negligence" state with an almost
non-existent case-law history of its courts awarding punitive
damages.


(73, Paul, K3FU)

- --
Paul W. Schleck

http://www.novia.net/~pschleck/
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