Read section II as I've stated and quit beating around the bush ignoring the
contents. It specificaly mentions NAL, the review process etc. It's all
mentioned right there. I'll quote for you since you can't read.

http://www.fcc.gov/ogc/documents/opi...03/01-1485.pdf
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II
Before considering the merits of AT&T's challenge, we
must address the Commission's argument that we lack jurisdiction
over appeals from NAL forfeiture proceedings. The

this is a NAL forfeiture proceeding appeal Landshark. It says so VERY
CLEARLY.
It is being challenged in a court of law, specifically :

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

So what part of "NAL", "Appeal", "United States Court of Appeals" etc.
don't you
understand?

NAL procedure is just one of two ways in which the Commission
may impose forfeiture penalties, each of which comes
with a different set of jurisdictional requirements-differences
that are relevant to the issue before us.

Gee guess what? The court even says the NAL precedures
are "relevant to the issue before us". Even the court once again says
this is
about a NAL, regardless of how much you want to spin it.

See generally
Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 59 F.3d 1249, 1253-
54 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (describing the two forfeiture procedures).
Under the first and more formal procedure, the Commission
provides notice to the alleged violator and affords it an
opportunity for a hearing before an administrative law judge,

And as I've said before one avenue is a review in front of an
administrative law judge as I've asserted several times before, despite
Frank's
protestations to the contrary.

who may then choose to impose forfeiture penalties. 47
U.S.C. § 503(b)(3)(A). The resulting forfeiture order is then
subject to review in the court of appeals. Id. If the penalty

Gee Landshark it says right here in the court's own words you can appeal
the NAL,
i.e. the forfeiture order.

remains unpaid once the forfeiture determination becomes
final, the United States may bring a collection action in
district court. Id. § 503(b)(3)(B).

Under the less formal NAL procedure at issue in this case,
the Commission issues a notice of apparent liability to the
alleged violator, affording it only the opportunity to show, in
writing, why no forfeiture penalty should be imposed. Id.
§ 503(b)(4). The Commission may then issue an order directing
payment of the proposed forfeiture, reducing the amount
to be paid, or canceling the forfeiture altogether. 47 C.F.R.
§ 1.80(f)(4). If the order becomes final and the forfeiture
subject refuses to pay, then Communications Act section
504(a) permits the Commission to refer the matter to the
Department of Justice for commencement of a civil action to
recover the forfeiture in a district court, where the forfeiture
subject is entitled to a trial de novo. 47 U.S.C. § 504(a).
The Commission argues that unlike the formal hearing
forfeiture process, where the Communications Act expressly
gives courts of appeals jurisdiction to review forfeiture orders,
the less formal NAL forfeiture proceedings are not
subject to review in courts of appeals. The plain language of
the Communications Act indicates otherwise. Section 402(a),
the Act's general review provision, vests in courts of appeals
exclusive jurisdiction over ''[a]ny proceeding to enjoin, set
aside, annul or suspend'' or determine the validity of final
Commission orders, 47 U.S.C. § 402(a); see 28 U.S.C.
§ 2342(1)-a category that includes forfeiture orders, see

i.e. "NALs. The Appellate court disagrees with the FCC, and guess who
wins
that argument? The court. They even cite the relevant CFR section.

Illinois Citizens Comm. for Broad. v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397, 402
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (holding that the court of appeals has jurisdiction
over a third party's challenge to a paid forfeiture
order pursuant to section 402(a)). And although section
504(a) creates an exception to that general rule, that exception
is, by its express terms, limited to government actions for
the recovery of forfeiture penalties: Section 504(a) provides
that NAL forfeitures ''shall be recoverable TTT in a civil suit
in the name of the United States'' brought in the district
court, and that ''any suit for the recovery of a forfeiture
6
imposed pursuant to the provisions of this chapter shall be a
trial de novo.'' 47 U.S.C. § 504(a) (emphasis added). Because
section 504(a) says nothing about district court jurisdiction
where the forfeiture has already been recovered, it
appears to leave court of appeals jurisdiction intact where, as
here, the forfeiture subject has paid the assessed penalty.
Though the Commission agrees that section 504(a) deals
only with challenges to unpaid forfeiture orders, it argues
that section 504(a) nevertheless overrides section 402(a), albeit
implicitly, for purposes of challenging paid forfeiture
orders. For that proposition, the Commission relies on
Pleasant Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 564 F.2d 496 (D.C. Cir.
1977). Addressing the question of court of appeals jurisdiction
over NAL forfeiture orders, Pleasant Broadcasting
states that ''section 504 of the Communications Act of 1934
vests exclusive jurisdiction in the district courts to review, in
the first instance, licensee challenges to forfeiture orders.''
Id. at 497 (citation omitted). According to the Commission,
Pleasant Broadcasting holds that section 504(a) vests exclusive
jurisdiction in district courts for review of all forfeiture
orders, paid or unpaid. And because section 504(a) contains
no provision for post-compliance review, the Commission argues,
Pleasant Broadcasting means that forfeiture subjects
must either bring a pre-compliance challenge in district court
or bring no challenge at all; payment effectively renders
forfeiture orders unreviewable.

Despite its broad statement of its holding, Pleasant Broadcasting
provides little support for the Commission's theory.
To begin with, Pleasant Broadcasting deals not with the
question of post-compliance review of forfeiture orders, but
rather with a forfeiture subject's challenge to an unpaid
forfeiture order. The court's reasoning reflects the importance
of that distinction. Limiting its holding to cases in
which section 504's ''special review mechanism'' is both adequate
and available, the court distinguished Illinois Citizens,
515 F.2d 397, in which this court accepted jurisdiction over
public-interest groups' challenge to a Commission forfeiture
for broadcasting obscene and indecent materials despite the
7
fact that the broadcaster had already paid the penalty. Under
those circumstances, where section 504 proceedings to
collect the forfeiture ''would never have been instituted,''
Pleasant Broadcasting says that section 504 review is ''unavailable,''
and court of appeals review pursuant to section
402(a) is therefore ''appropriate.'' Id. at 501, 502-03. Although
Illinois Citizens involved a third-party challenge to a
paid forfeiture order, the same logic applies when the forfeiture
subject itself seeks to bring a post-compliance challenge:
Because payment renders section 504 review ''unavailable,''
court of appeals review pursuant to section 402(a) is ''appropriate.''
Pleasant Broadcasting's holding, moreover, rests at least in
part on the court's concern that allowing forfeiture subjects to
bring challenges to forfeiture orders in courts of appeals
would give them the proverbial ''two bites at the apple'':
They would ''be able to challenge the forfeiture order in a
court of appeals on the basis of the administrative record and,
if unsuccessful, TTT litigate all issues de novo in the district
court, with a right of appeal to the court of appeals.'' Id. at
501. Even under the Commission's theory, that danger does
not exist here. Because section 504(a) review is, by its terms,
available only in recovery actions, AT&T will get just one
bite.

In the end, Pleasant Broadcasting tells us only that section
504(a) establishes district courts as the exclusive forum for
challenges to unpaid forfeiture orders. Like section 504(a)
itself, it has no effect on court of appeals jurisdiction to
review challenges to paid forfeiture orders.
To be sure, as the Commission points out, allowing forfeiture
subjects to choose between challenging unpaid forfeiture
orders in district court and challenging paid forfeiture orders
in the court of appeals means that they can control the forum
of review by deciding whether or not to pay the penalty. The
obvious answer to this concern is section 504(a)'s plain language:
By limiting district court jurisdiction to unpaid forfeitures,
it gives forfeiture subjects that very choice. Such
forum-controlling compliance choices, moreover, are common
8
in statutes providing for judicial review of regulatory decisions.
The Communications Act itself contains another such
provision, which allows telecommunications carriers subject to
orders that conclude complaint-initiated investigations either
to appeal the order in the court of appeals under section
402(a), 47 U.S.C. § 208(b)(3), or, assuming the order requires
the payment of money, to refuse to comply and instead wait
for the complainant to file a petition in district court, id.
§ 407.

Moreover, even where, as here, a statute fails to make the
choice explicit, but rather provides only a special procedural
mechanism for the government to collect payments owed to it,
that choice nevertheless remains; the collection mechanism
has no effect on the payer's ability to obtain post-compliance
review pursuant to generally applicable jurisdictional principles.

Again the court states that you have a review course of action.
They, the court, even cite further case law to support their postion.

For example, in the customs context, where Congress
granted exclusive jurisdiction to the Court of International
Trade over suits for the recovery of certain civil penalties, 28
U.S.C. § 1582(1), penalty subjects may ''obtain[ ] judicial review
in the Court of International Trade by refusing to pay
the penalty and waiting for the government to commence an
enforcement action.'' Trayco, Inc. v. United States, 994 F.2d
832, 837 (Fed. Cir. 1993). But they also have ''the option, and
more importantly, the right'' to pay the penalty and later
''initiate suit in the district court to challenge the penalty''
pursuant to the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2). Id.
Similarly, here, where AT&T has already paid the penalty
rather than wait for the Government to commence a recovery
action, it has the option-and the right-to initiate suit in the
court of appeals pursuant to section 402(a).
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Why are you so resistance to the idea that there is a jurisdictional review
process? And as you can read above there are two ways to do it, prepay the
fine or not. Depending on the choice made determines how the process is
done, i.e. which court you have to go to. You seem to want to really believe
that the FCC is some kind of rouge agency that does as it pleases without
any checks and balances. It just isn't so. All I can figure out is you want
to believe this so you can justifiy FCC regulation violations in your own
mind, feel better about it, and excuse others for being held acountable.

--
Leland C. Scott
KC8LDO

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