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Old December 18th 05, 11:04 PM posted to rec.radio.amateur.policy
 
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Default Definitely Not Qualified

From: Frank Gilliland on Dec 18, 11:00 am

On Sun, 18 Dec 2005 17:19:28 GMT, Dave Heil wrote
wrote:


part of the military that wasn't glamorous, didn't wear flashy
or cute uniforms, and bore the brunt of national defense as it
always has since 1776...with the casualty rates the highest of
any branch, from battlefields of Pennsylvania to the Persian
Gulf area of Dubya's rule.


The Signal Corps has the highest casualty rate, or did you mean the U.S.
Army?


The Signal Corps. The first target of any combat unit is the guy (or
tank, amtrack, jeep, etc.) with the antennas. The second target is the
guy -next- to the guy with the antenna because he is usually an
officer.


Frank, I originally wrote ARMY, relative to Navy, Air Force, etc.

Davie, in an effort to be as dick-tatorial as possible, edited
the quote to set up a following rebuke of the Signal Corps.

Department of Defense casualty figures are the reference as to
which branch gives the most. Anyone can look those up.

In the Army the "front-line" (we called them just "line")
radio users were just ordinary infantry, artillery, or armor
troops who've had quickie courses in using their radios.

Those aren't Signal Corpsmen per se.

Is that something to brag about?


Yep. It takes some big, hairy balls to walk onto the battlefield
carrying a piece of equipment that will be the first thing the enemy
shoots at, especially when the radio is bulky and/or heavy enough to
limit your mobility. The casualty rate for radiomen in combat is even
higher than EOD.


That used to be true but the paradigm has flipped over today.
The common manpack radio is the SINCGARS for land forces, both
Army and Marines. The SIP or SINCGARS Improvement Program has
resulted in a manpack radio that is half the bulk and half the
weight of the original (beginning 1989) SINCGARS sets. Some
250 thousand total R/Ts were manufactured and operational as of
the end of 2004, making that the most-produced military radio
of all time...roughly double that of the PRC-25/-77 of the
Vietnam era. I don't have any current figures on the SIP
production-fielding, but the older SINCGARS cases-chassis
(PRC-119) have been turning up on E-Bay, so there is a new
beginning "surplus" area for "green" (military) collectors.

When I was in, we "rear echelon" troops would exercise in
infantry training using PRC-6s and PRC-9s (manpack). Those
VHF whips aren't that noticeable and the (about) 20 pound
manpack radio was half the weight and bulk of the old WW2
SCR-300 Walkie-Talkie. Being of average height and build,
I never found it limited my mobility much then.

During the Korean War active phase, the highest casualty rate
got specialized to the pole linemen...extremely vulnerable
targets at work with absolutely no cover but the pole. The
Army got wise unusually quickly and set about getting lay-on-
the-ground multi-channel cable such as the "Spiral-4" stuff
used in newer terminal/radio-relay equipments. That was used
more than aerial line pairs in Vietnam. I doubt that big,
hairy ball USAF MARS operators in SE Asia ever noticed that.

The SE Asian topography and dictated limited movement of troops
led to concentrations of communications on whatever hilltops
could be secured. That led to concentration of enemy fire on
those relatively concentrated units with resulting heavy
casualties. The Army was stuck with most of those tasks
although the Marines did some of those radio hilltops. USAF
MARS operators weren't doing those things, despite their
claims of "being in-country" as much as combat troops.

By 1990-1991 the "command track" concept of concentration of
radios in certain vehicles was already lessening. Newer
radios were more multi-purpose, multi-band, more agile and
there were fewer tell-tale antennas to spot. Desert Storm
isn't a good model for comparison since EVERYONE on land was
ON THE MOVE in perhaps the quickest panzerfaust operation of
any military at any time. It was largely armor-against-armor
in an overwhelming over-run condition. The USAF and Navy Air
had cut the Iraqi communications centers already during
Desert Shield, leaving their ground forces with limited
command track capability and little coordination. It was a
rout for our side, taking only five days of ground war.

By the time of Dubya's War, things were turned around again.
Humvees are the local "command tracks" all over and the
targets of hidden bombs and mines. Those are indiscrimate
as to whether they have visible radio equipment or not.
Different game, different rules, different playing field.

While land forces have radios with excellent resistance to
interception and jamming, we are up against Iraqis (and
Afghanis) who aren't "radio knowledgeable" to any useful
degree and don't know enough to look for "command tracks"
or antenna concentrations. EVERYONE who wears a uniform
in those areas needs big, hairy balls to venture about.

Happy Christmas