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#1
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Palin/Dobbs 2012
John Galt wrote:
And you need to start being honest. I was an adult during the period. There was no public discourse about any pending economic dissolution of the Soviet Union, and since Reagan ran on a platform of increased military spending because of the demonstrated Soviet imperialism, it obviously would have been raised during the campaign by Carter and the Democrat Doves. It was not. JG I was a major market radio news director during the period. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Cyclone (this is from your CIA) "The Failing System From the mid-1970s to the eve of Gorbachev's assumption of party leadership in the spring of 1985, the CIA portrayed a Soviet Union plagued by a deteriorating economy and intensifying societal problems. CIA products described the growing political tensions resulting from these failures, the prospect that sooner or later a Soviet leadership would be forced to confront these issues, and the uncertainty over what form this confrontation would take. These products include the unclassified testimony from each of DCI Admiral Stansfield Turner's annual appearances before the JEC from 1977 through 1980 (Appendix A, references 1-4)--part of the "annual public reports" cited by the HPSCI Review Committee. Turner's testimony and the written submissions for these hearings described a "bleak" Soviet economy for which continued decline through most of the 1980s was "inevitable." The hearing reports include: * CIA descriptions of how badly Soviet economic performance lagged behind that of the West and the prospect that Soviet leaders would be forced to confront growing conflicts between civilian and military uses of resources and investment. * CIA assessments that the Brezhnev leadership recognized the potential for larger political repercussions from the economic failure; that the Brezhnev regime (and possibly even an initial successor) was nonetheless likely to attempt to muddle through rather than confront the politically difficult choices necessary to deal with the decline; that muddling through was not a viable option for the longer term; and that by the mid-1980s the economic picture "might look so dismal" that a post-Brezhnev leadership might coalesce behind policies that could include "structural reforms." Other unclassified CIA publications disseminated in 1977 and 1980 (Appendix A, references 5 and 6) presented the same picture of a deteriorating economy that ultimately could provoke more radical policies. From the late 1970s through the early 1980s, CIA produced several papers addressing the prospects for "serious economic and political problems" arising from the combined effect of growing consumer discontent, ethnic divisions, a corrupt and incompetent political system, and widespread cynicism among a populace for whom the system had failed to deliver on its promises. (Appendix A, references 7 and 8 and 10-13). One of these papers, for example, described the problems stemming from "long continued investment priorities favoring heavy industry and defense, coupled with a rigid and cumbersome system of economic organization" which "have combined to produce a consumer sector that not only lags behind both the West and Eastern Europe, but also is in many ways primitive, grossly unbalanced, and in massive disequilibrium": * These products portrayed a Soviet leadership caught in a descending spiral: declining productivity was depressing the economy, which aggravated the cynicism and alienation of the populace; this in turn further reduced productivity. * CIA concluded that this "vicious circle" was potentially more significant for the 1980s than "anything the regime has had to cope with in the past three decades," and that the leadership and elites were fully aware they confronted major problems. * The analyses repeated the judgment that the Brezhnev regime and the Andropov/Chernyenko successions were likely to rely on the traditional Soviet instruments for controlling unrest and imposing "discipline," but that such approaches would not hold for the longer term in the face of a Soviet populace that was becoming less pliable and more demanding." https://www.cia.gov/library/center-f...oviet.html#ft5 |
#2
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Palin/Dobbs 2012
dave wrote: John Galt wrote: And you need to start being honest. I was an adult during the period. There was no public discourse about any pending economic dissolution of the Soviet Union, and since Reagan ran on a platform of increased military spending because of the demonstrated Soviet imperialism, it obviously would have been raised during the campaign by Carter and the Democrat Doves. It was not. JG I was a major market radio news director during the period. Drugs put an end to that, boy? |
#3
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Palin/Dobbs 2012
dave wrote:
John Galt wrote: And you need to start being honest. I was an adult during the period. There was no public discourse about any pending economic dissolution of the Soviet Union, and since Reagan ran on a platform of increased military spending because of the demonstrated Soviet imperialism, it obviously would have been raised during the campaign by Carter and the Democrat Doves. It was not. JG I was a major market radio news director during the period. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Cyclone See above. You may wish to focus your attention on the term "public" prior to "discourse." These issues were not front-and-center during the 1980 presidential campaign, which is the relevant issue. JG (this is from your CIA) "The Failing System From the mid-1970s to the eve of Gorbachev's assumption of party leadership in the spring of 1985, the CIA portrayed a Soviet Union plagued by a deteriorating economy and intensifying societal problems. CIA products described the growing political tensions resulting from these failures, the prospect that sooner or later a Soviet leadership would be forced to confront these issues, and the uncertainty over what form this confrontation would take. These products include the unclassified testimony from each of DCI Admiral Stansfield Turner's annual appearances before the JEC from 1977 through 1980 (Appendix A, references 1-4)--part of the "annual public reports" cited by the HPSCI Review Committee. Turner's testimony and the written submissions for these hearings described a "bleak" Soviet economy for which continued decline through most of the 1980s was "inevitable." The hearing reports include: * CIA descriptions of how badly Soviet economic performance lagged behind that of the West and the prospect that Soviet leaders would be forced to confront growing conflicts between civilian and military uses of resources and investment. * CIA assessments that the Brezhnev leadership recognized the potential for larger political repercussions from the economic failure; that the Brezhnev regime (and possibly even an initial successor) was nonetheless likely to attempt to muddle through rather than confront the politically difficult choices necessary to deal with the decline; that muddling through was not a viable option for the longer term; and that by the mid-1980s the economic picture "might look so dismal" that a post-Brezhnev leadership might coalesce behind policies that could include "structural reforms." Other unclassified CIA publications disseminated in 1977 and 1980 (Appendix A, references 5 and 6) presented the same picture of a deteriorating economy that ultimately could provoke more radical policies. From the late 1970s through the early 1980s, CIA produced several papers addressing the prospects for "serious economic and political problems" arising from the combined effect of growing consumer discontent, ethnic divisions, a corrupt and incompetent political system, and widespread cynicism among a populace for whom the system had failed to deliver on its promises. (Appendix A, references 7 and 8 and 10-13). One of these papers, for example, described the problems stemming from "long continued investment priorities favoring heavy industry and defense, coupled with a rigid and cumbersome system of economic organization" which "have combined to produce a consumer sector that not only lags behind both the West and Eastern Europe, but also is in many ways primitive, grossly unbalanced, and in massive disequilibrium": * These products portrayed a Soviet leadership caught in a descending spiral: declining productivity was depressing the economy, which aggravated the cynicism and alienation of the populace; this in turn further reduced productivity. * CIA concluded that this "vicious circle" was potentially more significant for the 1980s than "anything the regime has had to cope with in the past three decades," and that the leadership and elites were fully aware they confronted major problems. * The analyses repeated the judgment that the Brezhnev regime and the Andropov/Chernyenko successions were likely to rely on the traditional Soviet instruments for controlling unrest and imposing "discipline," but that such approaches would not hold for the longer term in the face of a Soviet populace that was becoming less pliable and more demanding." https://www.cia.gov/library/center-f...oviet.html#ft5 |
#4
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Palin/Dobbs 2012
John Galt wrote:
I was a major market radio news director during the period. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Cyclone See above. You may wish to focus your attention on the term "public" prior to "discourse." These issues were not front-and-center during the 1980 presidential campaign, which is the relevant issue. JG It was a secret. Do you remember Iran-Contra? Reagan had more convicted staffers than any president since Grant probably. |
#5
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Palin/Dobbs 2012
dave wrote:
John Galt wrote: I was a major market radio news director during the period. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Cyclone See above. You may wish to focus your attention on the term "public" prior to "discourse." These issues were not front-and-center during the 1980 presidential campaign, which is the relevant issue. JG It was a secret. Exactly the point. The candidate Reagan ran, in part, on a platform of rebuilding the military in the face of increasing Soviet imperialism. IN HINDSIGHT, history appears to show that the USSR would have caved in on its own over time. That's fine, but it's hardly Reagan's fault that he was unable to see into the future. (Although his wife tried her best.) Do you remember Iran-Contra? Reagan had more convicted staffers than any president since Grant probably. Nixon wins that metric, but Reagan had his share. However, if you use that metric, the best president in modern times was GW Bush, with zero convictions from the Cabinet or key staff. I'm guessing you dislike that fact. JG |
#6
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Palin/Dobbs 2012
John Galt wrote:
dave wrote: Do you remember Iran-Contra? Reagan had more convicted staffers than any president since Grant probably. Nixon wins that metric, but Reagan had his share. However, if you use that metric, the best president in modern times was GW Bush, with zero convictions from the Cabinet or key staff. I'm guessing you dislike that fact. JG You obviously don't remember Iran Contra. Herbert Pappy Bush never gets any mess on himself. Too bad about Bill Casey. |
#7
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Palin/Dobbs 2012
dave wrote:
John Galt wrote: dave wrote: Do you remember Iran-Contra? Reagan had more convicted staffers than any president since Grant probably. Nixon wins that metric, but Reagan had his share. However, if you use that metric, the best president in modern times was GW Bush, with zero convictions from the Cabinet or key staff. I'm guessing you dislike that fact. JG You obviously don't remember Iran Contra. I do very well. He wasn't under discussion. JG Herbert Pappy Bush never gets any mess on himself. Too bad about Bill Casey. |
#8
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Palin/Dobbs 2012
"John Galt" wrote in message ... dave wrote: John Galt wrote: dave wrote: Do you remember Iran-Contra? Reagan had more convicted staffers than any president since Grant probably. Nixon wins that metric, but Reagan had his share. However, if you use that metric, the best president in modern times was GW Bush, with zero convictions from the Cabinet or key staff. I'm guessing you dislike that fact. JG You obviously don't remember Iran Contra. I do very well. He wasn't under discussion. JG Herbert Pappy Bush never gets any mess on himself. Too bad about Bill Casey. .. .. Incompetence is not illegal! |
#9
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Palin/Dobbs 2012
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#10
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Palin/Dobbs 2012
Toxic wrote:
On Fri, 13 Nov 2009 08:41:41 -0600, John Galt wrote: dave wrote: Do you remember Iran-Contra? Reagan had more convicted staffers than any president since Grant probably. Nixon wins that metric, but Reagan had his share. However, if you use that metric, the best president in modern times was GW Bush, with zero convictions from the Cabinet or key staff. So far the economic distraction has served to stall any prosecutorial activity against the former criminal regime of the Bushco gang. Without reason to think otherwise, I suspect the reason has more to do with a lack of actionable evidence. Criminal courts still run on a beyond-reasonable-doubt standard, and it is highly unlikely that anything related to the decisioning around the Iraqi invasion would meet that standard. JG I'm guessing you dislike that fact. I doubt anyone is thrilled by Bush's residue, except maybe the heavily moneyed sorts that are able to finesse those bailout ransoms the taxpayers are being hit with. |
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