Reply
 
LinkBack Thread Tools Search this Thread Display Modes
  #31   Report Post  
Old May 2nd 05, 04:44 PM
K4YZ
 
Posts: n/a
Default

More mistruth from the N9OGL lie-fest, n9oglvoice.blogspot.com:

Well, the beat goes on, and the question is who's threating who? Let's
start at he beginning, N9OGL (ME) announced on the newsgroup
rec.radio.amateur,policy that I was going to run an information
bulletin on HF. (An Information bulletin is not defined by the FCC
except that an information bulletin has to be directed to amateur radio
operators and consist solely of amateur radio material.(97.3(a)(26)

An "information bulletin" that you refer to as a "show". A "show"
that is nothing more than a showcase for your rhetoric..

It was then that control freak Steven Robbieson K4YZ began his nazi
style campaign against me and my information bulletin claiming it was
illegal and even had the balls to tell my internet service provider
that I was "promote wanton violation of federal regulations" (Letter to
Illinois Consolidated Communication). He claimed all this #### despite
the fact that I proved that he was full of ####.

Todd...I gave you a "pass" on this the first time around because I
know it was too easy for you to get confused with everything going
on...

You ARE promoting wanton violation of FCC rules and regulations.
You have stated, on numerous occassions, that you operated both a
"pirate" TV and FM station...You've said you'd do it again.

I gave a link to the FCC website that stated what I've been say the
whole time, that my staion is legal and there NOTHING he can do about
it.

So you have.

And I provided links to YOUR assertions of the aforementioned
"pirate" operations. Along with your gross profanities, razor blade
comments, references to my deceased daughter, etc etc etc.

Civil people don't act that way, Todd, and your ISP agreed. You
were warned but blew it off.

He claims that I'm abusive yet he has to cry and whine like the little
##### he is, to my service provider claiming I'm promote wanton
violation of federal law although he knows dam well that my information
bulletin are legal,

It's not about your shows, Todd....

If he doesn't then he is just as dumb as I thought he was. Speaking of
dumb, that brings us to steve's girlfriend Little Jimmy KC8GXW who
claims he's going to run two radio's on either side of my information
bulletin (malicious Interference).

And like I said...If he does, then that's on him...And my wife
won't let me have a girlfriend, Todd.

Although he might think it funny that he and his little #### K4YZ is
"yanking my chain" we will see if the FCC thinks their yanking my chain
is funny!

I am not yanking your chain, Todd...I told you it had BEEN
yanked...

So who's threating who? we have liar K4YZ and his little whore Jimmy
getting on the newsgroup acting like they own the place and suggestion
to cause malicious interference with my LEGAL station.

You SAY it's legal. We have no evidence of it. You randymouthed
other correspondents about being "appliance operators", yet when tasked
to list YOUR station, you balked.

I hope that people on that newsgroup wise up and kick Stevey and Jimmy
harassing ###es off the newsgroup.

The harrassing one already got booted, Todd. At least for a
while...The one who signed your name and call yesterday was actually
polite and civil. Was that you, or did you give someone your
password...?!?!

Steve, K4YZ

  #32   Report Post  
Old May 2nd 05, 04:45 PM
Cmd Buzz Corey
 
Posts: n/a
Default

Mel A. Nomah wrote:
"Bill Sohl" wrote in message
nk.net...

:
: Yet we all know yelling "fire" in a theater is illegal and forbidden by
: law...
:

Show us the law.

Freedom of speech gives you the right. That doesn't mean you -do- that, it
means you -have the freedom to do- that, which is an excellent freedom to
have available if you should happen to see a fire in a theater.

Practically, if you hear someone yell "FIRE!" then you have some decisions
to make. Are you going to believe that person or not, especially when you
see nothing? If you do believe this person, are you going to run for the
door like a crazed animal, or quickly make your way to the exit in a
civilized manner?

Whichever you choose, it's -your- choice and -your- responsibility. It
is -not- the responsibility of the person who yelled "FIRE!" that -you-
chose one direction or another.

Thinking that it is the responsibility of the person who yelled "FIRE!"
strips your power away from you and makes you not responsible for your
life. Is that what you want?



I suggest the next time you go to the theater, stand up in the middle of
the movie and yell "FIRE!!!!" and see what happens if there is no fire.
See if the people who belive you and exit the theater get arrested or if
you are the one who gets arrested.
You have the freedom to talk about hijacking a plane too, but go to an
airport and tell the security guard you are thinking of hijacking a
plane and see what happens. Freedom of speech does not give anyone the
right to say anything, anywhere, anytime they please without facing
possible consequences.
  #33   Report Post  
Old May 2nd 05, 04:51 PM
KØHB
 
Posts: n/a
Default


"N9OGL" wrote

I have never used my ham radio for commercial use nor have I used foul
language on it either. Steve assumes that since I do it on the internet
then I do it on the ham radio. Steve has never heard my transmission
yet he claims that's what I'm doing.
Todd N9OGL


Todd,

Thanks for cleaning up your language.

73, de Hans, K0HB

PS: I think you "bulletin station" is an idea which should not be tossed aside
lightly. It should be hurled aside with great force. But that's just me.



  #34   Report Post  
Old May 2nd 05, 05:19 PM
N9OGL
 
Posts: n/a
Default

Steve,

An "information bulletin" that you refer to as a "show". A "show"
that is nothing more than a showcase for your rhetoric..


Despite what you hink steve and information bulletin doesn't have to be
a "newscast" it only has to be directed only to amteur radio operators
consisting solely of subject matter of direct interest to the amateur
service.

Todd...I gave you a "pass" on this the first time around because I
know it was too easy for you to get confused with everything going
on...


You ARE promoting wanton violation of FCC rules and regulations.
You have stated, on numerous occassions, that you operated both a
"pirate" TV and FM station...You've said you'd do it again.


First off I never ran a Pirate radio station, I applied for a LPFM
license, Secondly that's between me and the FCC, and as I stated before
they will NOT doing anything about, and finally You don't know what the
HELL was going on so I suggest you shut your ****ing mouth, that does
concern you.

And I provided links to YOUR assertions of the aforementioned
"pirate" operations. Along with your gross profanities, razor blade
comments, references to my deceased daughter, etc etc etc.
Civil people don't act that way, Todd, and your ISP agreed. You
were warned but blew it off.


First off you taking the razor blade too serious....I don't you name in
that post and was not directed towards you directly. The problem with
service porviders is they only respond to complaints they don't
investigate the complaint. if my ISP was on here and realize what a
PRICK you are perhaps they would change their mine.

You SAY it's legal. We have no evidence of it. You randymouthed
other correspondents about being "appliance operators", yet when

tasked
to list YOUR station, you balked


Below there is a link to the FCC website where you and others on this
website can read all about information bulletins

http://wireless.fcc.gov/services/ama...nications.html


The harrassing one already got booted, Todd. At least for a
while...The one who signed your name and call yesterday was actually
polite and civil. Was that you, or did you give someone your
password...?!?!


Well steve on a final note I hope that people on this newsgroup wise up
and get sick of your harassment and boot your sorry ass off the
newsgroup

Todd N9OGL

  #35   Report Post  
Old May 2nd 05, 05:34 PM
N9OGL
 
Posts: n/a
Default

Well Hans Information bulletins are legal and there's really nothing
anyone can do about it. I'm currently working with the House
Subcommittee on Telecommunication to resolve this information bulletin
problem.

Todd N9OGL



  #36   Report Post  
Old May 2nd 05, 05:57 PM
N9OGL
 
Posts: n/a
Default

Steve,

here's some light reading for you!!!

Todd N9OGL


SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

------------------------------------------------------------------------

No. 96-511

------------------------------------------------------------------------

JANET RENO, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, et al., APPELLANTS
v=2E AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION et al.

on appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania

[June 26, 1997]


Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court.

At issue is the constitutionality of two statutory provisions enacted
to protect minors from "indecent" and "patently offensive"
communications on the Internet. Notwithstanding the legitimacy and
importance of the congressional goal of protecting children from
harmful materials, we agree with the three judge District Court that
the statute abridges "the freedom of speech" protected by the First
Amendment. [n.1]




The District Court made extensive findings of fact, most of which were
based on a detailed stipulation prepared by the parties. See 929 F.
Supp. 824, 830-849 (ED Pa. 1996). [n.2] The findings describe the
character and the dimensions of the Internet, the availability
ofsexually explicit material in that medium, and the problems
confronting age verification for recipients of Internet communications.
Because those findings provide the underpinnings for the legal issues,
we begin with a summary of the undisputed facts.


The Internet

The Internet is an international network of interconnected computers.
It is the outgrowth of what began in 1969 as a military program called
"ARPANET," [n.3] which was designed to enable computers operated by the
military, defense contractors, and universities conducting defense
related research to communicate with one another by redundant channels
even if some portions of the network were damaged in a war. While the
ARPANET no longer exists, it provided an example for the development of
a number of civilian networks that, eventually linking with each other,
now enable tens of millions of people to communicate with one another
and to access vast amounts of information from around the world. The
Internet is "a unique and wholly new medium of worldwide human
communication." [n.4]

The Internet has experienced "extraordinary growth." [n.5] The number
of "host" computers--those that store information and relay
communications--increased from about 300 in 1981 to approximately
9,400,000 by the time of the trial in 1996. Roughly 60% of these hosts
are located in the United States. About 40 million people used the
Internet at the time of trial, a number that is expected to mushroom to
200 million by 1999.

Individuals can obtain access to the Internet frommany different
sources, generally hosts themselves or entities with a host
affiliation. Most colleges and universities provide access for their
students and faculty; many corporations provide their employees with
access through an office network; many communities and local libraries
provide free access; and an increasing number of storefront "computer
coffee shops" provide access for a small hourly fee. Several major
national "online services" such as America Online, CompuServe, the
Microsoft Network, and Prodigy offer access to their own extensive
proprietary networks as well as a link to the much larger resources of
the Internet. These commercial online services had almost 12 million
individual subscribers at the time of trial.

Anyone with access to the Internet may take advantage of a wide variety
of communication and information retrieval methods. These methods are
constantly evolving and difficult to categorize precisely. But, as
presently constituted, those most relevant to this case are electronic
mail ("e mail"), automatic mailing list services ("mail exploders,"
sometimes referred to as "listservs"), "newsgroups," "chat rooms," and
the "World Wide Web." All of these methods can be used to transmit
text; most can transmit sound, pictures, and moving video images. Taken
together, these tools constitute a unique medium--known to its users as
"cyberspace"--located in no particular geographical location but
available to anyone, anywhere in the world, with access to the
Internet.

E mail enables an individual to send an electronic message--generally
akin to a note or letter--to another individual or to a group of
addressees. The message is generally stored electronically, sometimes
waiting for the recipient to check her "mailbox" and sometimes making
its receipt known through some type of prompt. A mail exploder is a
sort of e mail group. Subscribers can send messages to a common e mail
address, which then forwards the message to the group's other
subscribers.Newsgroups also serve groups of regular participants, but
these postings may be read by others as well. There are thousands of
such groups, each serving to foster an exchange of information or
opinion on a particular topic running the gamut from, say, the music of
Wagner to Balkan politics to AIDS prevention to the Chicago Bulls.
About 100,000 new messages are posted every day. In most newsgroups,
postings are automatically purged at regular intervals. In addition to
posting a message that can be read later, two or more individuals
wishing to communicate more immediately can enter a chat room to engage
in real time dialogue--in other words, by typing messages to one
another that appear almost immediately on the others' computer screens.
The District Court found that at any given time "tens of thousands of
users are engaging in conversations on a huge range of subjects." [n.6]
It is "no exaggeration to conclude that the content on the Internet is
as diverse as human thought." [n.7]

The best known category of communication over the Internet is the World
Wide Web, which allows users to search for and retrieve information
stored in remote computers, as well as, in some cases, to communicate
back to designated sites. In concrete terms, the Web consists of a vast
number of documents stored in different computers all over the world.
Some of these documents are simply files containing information.
However, more elaborate documents, commonly known as Web "pages," are
also prevalent. Each has its own address--%rather like a telephone
number." [n.8] Web pages frequently contain information and sometimes
allow the viewer to communicate with the page's (or "site's") author.
They generally also contain "links" to otherdocuments created by that
site's author or to other (generally) related sites. Typically, the
links are either blue or underlined text--sometimes images.

Navigating the Web is relatively straightforward. A user may either
type the address of a known page or enter one or more keywords into a
commercial "search engine" in an effort to locate sites on a subject of
interest. A particular Web page may contain the information sought by
the "surfer," or, through its links, it may be an avenue to other
documents located anywhere on the Internet. Users generally explore a
given Web page, or move to another, by clicking a computer "mouse" on
one of the page's icons or links. Access to most Web pages is freely
available, but some allow access only to those who have purchased the
right from a commercial provider. The Web is thus comparable, from the
readers' viewpoint, to both a vast library including millions of
readily available and indexed publications and a sprawling mall
offering goods and services.

From the publishers' point of view, it constitutes a vast platform from

which to address and hear from a world wide audience of millions of
readers, viewers, researchers, and buyers. Any person or organization
with a computer connected to the Internet can "publish" information.
Publishers include government agencies, educational institutions,
commercial entities, advocacy groups, and individuals. [n.9] Publishers
may either make their material available to the entire pool of Internet
users, or confine access to a selected group, such as those willing to
pay for the privilege. "No single organization controls any membership
in the Web, nor is there any centralized point from which individual
Web sites or services can be blocked from the Web." [n.10]


Sexually Explicit Material

Sexually explicit material on the Internet includes text, pictures, and
chat and "extends from the modestly titillating to the hardest core."
[n.11] These files are created, named, and posted in the same manner as
material that is not sexually explicit, and may be accessed either
deliberately or unintentionally during the course of an imprecise
search. "Once a provider posts its content on the Internet, it cannot
prevent that content from entering any community." [n.12] Thus, for
example,

"when the UCR/California Museum of Photography posts to its Web site
nudes by Edward Weston and Robert Mapplethorpe to announce that its new
exhibit will travel to Baltimore and New York City, those images are
available not only in Los Angeles, Baltimore, and New York City, but
also in Cincinnati, Mobile, or Beijing--wherever Internet users live.
Similarly, the safer sex instructions that Critical Path posts to its
Web site, written in street language so that the teenage receiver can
understand them, are available not just in Philadelphia, but also in
Provo and Prague." [n.13]

Some of the communications over the Internet that originate in foreign
countries are also sexually explicit. [n.14]

Though such material is widely available, users seldomencounter such
content accidentally. "A document's title or a description of the
document will usually appear before the document itself . . . and in
many cases the user will receive detailed information about a site's
content before he or she need take the step to access the document.
Almost all sexually explicit images are preceded by warnings as to the
content." [n.15] For that reason, the "odds are slim" that a user would
enter a sexually explicit site by accident. [n.16] Unlike
communications received by radio or television, "the receipt of
information on the Internet requires a series of affirmative steps more
deliberate and directed than merely turning a dial. A child requires
some sophistication and some ability to read to retrieve material and
thereby to use the Internet unattended." [n.17]

Systems have been developed to help parents control the material that
may be available on a home computer with Internet access. A system may
either limit a computer's access to an approved list of sources that
have been identified as containing no adult material, it may block
designated inappropriate sites, or it may attempt to block messages
containing identifiable objectionable features. "Although parental
control software currently can screen for certain suggestive words or
for known sexually explicit sites, it cannot now screen for sexually
explicit images." [n.18] Nevertheless, the evidence indicates that "a
reasonably effective method by which parents can prevent their children
from accessing sexually explicit and other material which parents may
believe is inappropriate for their children will soon be available."
[n.19]


Age Verification

The problem of age verification differs for different uses of the
Internet. The District Court categorically determined that there "is no
effective way to determine the identity or the age of a user who is
accessing material through e mail, mail exploders, newsgroups or chat
rooms." [n.20] The Government offered no evidence that there was a
reliable way to screen recipients and participants in such fora for
age. Moreover, even if it were technologically feasible to block
minors' access to newsgroups and chat rooms containing discussions of
art, politics or other subjects that potentially elicit "indecent" or
"patently offensive" contributions, it would not be possible to block
their access to that material and "still allow them access to the
remaining content, even if the overwhelming majority of that content
was not indecent." [n.21]

Technology exists by which an operator of a Web site may condition
access on the verification of requested information such as a credit
card number or an adult password. Credit card verification is only
feasible, however, either in connection with a commercial transaction
in which the card is used, or by payment to averification agency. Using
credit card possession as a surrogate for proof of age would impose
costs on non commercial Web sites that would require many of them to
shut down. For that reason, at the time of the trial, credit card
verification was "effectively unavailable to a substantial number of
Internet content providers." Id., at 846 (finding 102). Moreover, the
imposition of such a requirement "would completely bar adults who do
not have a credit card and lack the resources to obtain one from
accessing any blocked material." [n.22]

Commercial pornographic sites that charge their users for access have
assigned them passwords as a method of age verification. The record
does not contain any evidence concerning the reliability of these
technologies. Even if passwords are effective for commercial purveyors
of indecent material, the District Court found that an adult password
requirement would impose significant burdens on noncommercial sites,
both because they would discourage users from accessing their sites and
because the cost of creating and maintaining such screening systems
would be "beyond their reach." [n.23]

In sum, the District Court found:

"Even if credit card verification or adult password verification were
implemented, the Government presented no testimony as to how such
systems could ensure that the user of the password or credit card is in
fact over 18. The burdens imposed by credit card verification and adult
password verification systems make them effectively unavailable to a
substantial number of Internet content providers." Ibid. (finding 107).





The Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, was
an unusually important legislative enactment. As stated on the first of
its 103 pages, its primary purpose was to reduce regulation and
encourage "the rapid deployment of new telecommunications
technologies." The major components of the statute have nothing to do
with the Internet; they were designed to promote competition in the
local telephone service market, the multichannel video market, and the
market for over the air broadcasting. The Act includes seven Titles,
six of which are the product of extensive committee hearings and the
subject of discussion in Reports prepared by Committees of the Senate
and the House of Representatives. By contrast, Title V--known as the
"Communications Decency Act of 1996" (CDA)--contains provisions that
were either added in executive committee after the hearings were
concluded or as amendments offered during floor debate on the
legislation. An amendment offered in the Senate was the source of the
two statutory provisions challenged in this case. [n.24] Theyare
informally described as the "indecent transmission" provision and the
"patently offensive display" provision. [n.25]

The first, 47 U. S. C. A. =A7223(a) (Supp. 1997), prohibits the knowing
transmission of obscene or indecent messages to any recipient under 18
years of age. It provides in pertinent part:

"(a) Whoever--

%(1) in interstate or foreign communications--

.. . . . .



"(B) by means of a telecommunications device knowingly--

%(i) makes, creates, or solicits, and

%(ii) initiates the transmission of,

%any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other
communication which is obscene or indecent, knowing that the recipient
of the communication is under 18 years of age, regardless of whether
the maker of such communication placedthe call or initiated the
communication;

.. . . . .

"(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under his
control to be used for any activity prohibited by paragraph (1) with
the intent that it be used for such activity,

%shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than two years,
or both."

The second provision, =A7223(d), prohibits the knowing sending or
displaying of patently offensive messages in a manner that is available
to a person under 18 years of age. It provides:

"(d) Whoever--

"(1) in interstate or foreign communications knowingly--

"(A) uses an interactive computer service to send to a specific person
or persons under 18 years of age, or

"(B) uses any interactive computer service to display in a manner
available to a person under 18 years of age,

%any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other
communication that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently
offensive asmeasured by contemporary community standards, sexual or
excretory activities or organs, regardless of whether the user of such
service placed the call or initiated the communication; or

"(2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under such
person's control to be used for an activity prohibited by paragraph (1)
with the intent that it be used for such activity,

%shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than two years,
or both."

The breadth of these prohibitions is qualified by two affirmative
defenses. See =A7223(e)(5). [n.26] One covers those who take "good
faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate actions" to restrict
access by minors to the prohibited communications. =A7223(e)(5)(A). The
other covers those who restrict access to covered material by requiring
certain designated forms of age proof, such as a verified credit card
or an adult identification number or code. =A7223(e)(5)(B).




On February 8, 1996, immediately after the Presidentsigned the statute,
20 plaintiffs [n.27] filed suit against the Attorney General of the
United States and the Department of Justice challenging the
constitutionality of =A7=A7223(a)(1) and 223(d). A week later, based on
his conclusion that the term "indecent" was too vague to provide the
basis for a criminal prosecution, District Judge Buckwalter entered a
temporary restraining order against enforcement of =A7223(a)(1)(B)(ii)
insofar as it applies to indecent communications. A second suit was
then filed by 27 additional plaintiffs, [n.28] the two cases were
consolidated, and a three judge District Court was convened pursuant to
=A7561 of the Act. [n.29] After an evidentiary hearing, that Court
entered a preliminary injunction against enforcement of both of the
challenged provisions. Each of the three judges wrote a separate
opinion, but their judgment was unanimous.

Chief Judge Sloviter doubted the strength of the Government's interest
in regulating "the vast range of online material covered or potentially
covered by the CDA," but acknowledged that the interest was
"compelling" with respect to some of that material. 929 F. Supp., at
853. She concluded, nonetheless, that the statute "sweeps more broadly
than necessary and thereby chills the expression of adults" and that
the terms "patently offensive" and "indecent" were "inherently vague."
Id., at 854. She also determined that the affirmative defenses were not
"technologically or economically feasible for most providers,"
specifically considering and rejecting an argument that providers could
avoid liability by "tagging" their material in a manner that would
allow potential readers to screen out unwanted transmissions. Id., at
856. Chief Judge Sloviter also rejected the Government's suggestion
that the scope of the statute could be narrowed by construing it to
apply only to commercial pornographers. Id., at 854-855.

Judge Buckwalter concluded that the word "indecent" in =A7223(a)(1)(B)
and the terms "patently offensive" and "in context" in =A7223(d)(1) were
so vague that criminal enforcement of either section would violate the
"fundamental constitutional principle" of "simple fairness," id., at
861, and the specific protections of the First and Fifth Amendments,
id., at 858. He found no statutory basis for the Government's argument
that the challenged provisions would be applied only to "pornographic"
materials, noting that, unlike obscenity, "indecency has not been
defined to exclude works of serious literary, artistic, political or
scientific value." Id., at 863. Moreover, the Government's claim that
the work must be considered patently offensive "in context" was itself
vague because the relevant context might "refer to, among other things,
the nature of the communication as a whole, the time of day it was
conveyed, the medium used, the identity of the speaker, or whether or
not it is accompanied by appropriate warnings." Id., at 864. He
believed that the unique nature of the Internet aggravated the
vagueness of the statute. Id., at 865, n. 9.

Judge Dalzell's review of "the special attributes of Internet
communication" disclosed by the evidence convinced him that the First
Amendment denies Congress the power to regulate the content of
protected speech on the Internet. Id., at 867. His opinion explained at
length why he believed the Act would abridge significant protected
speech, particularly by noncommercial speakers, while "[p]erversely,
commercial pornographers would remain relatively unaffected." Id., at
879. He construed our cases as requiring a "medium specific" approach
to the analysis of the regulation of mass communication, id., at 873,
and concluded that the Internet--as "the most participatory form of
mass speech yet developed," id., at 883--is entitled to "the highest
protection from governmental intrusion," ibid. [n.30]

The judgment of the District Court enjoins the Government from
enforcing the prohibitions in =A7223(a)(1)(B) insofar as they relate to
"indecent" communications, but expressly preserves the Government's
right to investigate and prosecute the obscenity or child pornography
activities prohibited therein. The injunction against enforcement of
=A7=A7223(d)(1) and (2) is unqualified because those provisions contain
no separate reference to obscenity or child pornography.

The Government appealed under the Act's special review provisions,
=A7561, 110 Stat. 142-143, and we noted probable jurisdiction, see 519
U=2E S. ___ (1996). In its appeal, the Government argues that the
District Court erred in holding that the CDA violated both the First
Amendment because it is overbroad and the Fifth Amendment because it is
vague. While we discuss the vagueness of the CDA because of its
relevance to the First Amendment overbreadth inquiry, we conclude that
the judgment should be affirmed without reaching the Fifth Amendment
issue. We begin our analysis by reviewing the principal authorities on
which the Government relies. Then, after describing the overbreadth of
the CDA, we consider the Government's specific contentions, including
its submission that we save portions of the statute either by severance
or by fashioning judicial limitations on the scope of its coverage.




In arguing for reversal, the Government contends that the CDA is
plainly constitutional under three ofour prior decisions: (1) Ginsberg
v=2E New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); (2) FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438
U=2ES. 726 (1978); and (3) Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41
(1986). A close look at these cases, however, raises--rather than
relieves--doubts concerning the constitutionality of the CDA.

In Ginsberg, we upheld the constitutionality of a New York statute that
prohibited selling to minors under 17 years of age material that was
considered obscene as to them even if not obscene as to adults. We
rejected the defendant's broad submission that "the scope of the
constitutional freedom of expression secured to a citizen to read or
see material concerned with sex cannot be made to depend on whether the
citizen is an adult or a minor." 390 U. S., at 636. In rejecting that
contention, we relied not only on the State's independent interest in
the well being of its youth, but also on our consistent recognition of
the principle that "the parents' claim to authority in their own
household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the
structure of our society." [n.31] In four important respects, the
statute upheld in Ginsberg was narrower than the CDA. First, we noted
in Ginsberg that "the prohibition against sales to minors does not bar
parents who so desire from purchasing the magazines for their
children." Id., at 639. Under the CDA, by contrast, neither the
parents' consent--nor even their participation--in the communication
would avoid the application of the statute. [n.32] Second, the NewYork
statute applied only to commercial transactions, id., at 647, whereas
the CDA contains no such limitation. Third, the New York statute
cabined its definition of material that is harmful to minors with the
requirement that it be "utterly without redeeming social importance for
minors." Id., at 646. The CDA fails to provide us with any definition
of the term "indecent" as used in=A7223(a)(1) and, importantly, omits
any requirement that the "patently offensive" material covered by
=A7223(d) lack serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value. Fourth, the New York statute defined a minor as a person under
the age of 17, whereas the CDA, in applying to all those under 18
years, includes an additional year of those nearest majority.

In Pacifica, we upheld a declaratory order of the Federal
Communications Commission, holding that the broadcast of a recording of
a 12-minute monologue entitled "Filthy Words" that had previously been
delivered to a live audience "could have been the subject of
administrative sanctions." 438 U. S., at 730 (internal quotations
omitted). The Commission had found that the repetitive use of certain
words referring to excretory or sexual activities or organs "in an
afternoon broadcast when children are in the audience was patently
offensive" and concluded that the monologue was indecent "as
broadcast." Id., at 735. The respondent did not quarrel with the
finding that the afternoon broadcast was patently offensive, but
contended that it was not "indecent" within the meaning of the relevant
statutes because it contained no prurient appeal. After rejecting
respondent's statutory arguments, we confronted its two constitutional
arguments: (1) that the Commission's construction of its authority to
ban indecent speech was so broad that its order had to be set aside
even if thebroadcast at issue was unprotected; and (2) that since the
recording was not obscene, the First Amendment forbade any abridgement
of the right to broadcast it on the radio.

In the portion of the lead opinion not joined by Justices Powell and
Blackmun, the plurality stated that the First Amendment does not
prohibit all governmental regulation that depends on the content of
speech. Id., at 742-743. Accordingly, the availability of
constitutional protection for a vulgar and offensive monologue that was
not obscene depended on the context of the broadcast. Id., at 744-748.
Relying on the premise that "of all forms of communication"
broadcasting had received the most limited First Amendment protection,
id., at 748-749, the Court concluded that the ease with which children
may obtain access to broadcasts, "coupled with the concerns recognized
in Ginsberg," justified special treatment of indecent broadcasting.
Id., at 749-750.

As with the New York statute at issue in Ginsberg, there are
significant differences between the order upheld in Pacifica and the
CDA. First, the order in Pacifica, issued by an agency that had been
regulating radio stations for decades, targeted a specific broadcast
that represented a rather dramatic departure from traditional program
content in order to designate when--rather than whether--it would be
permissible to air such a program in that particular medium. The CDA's
broad categorical prohibitions are not limited to particular times and
are not dependent on any evaluation by an agency familiar with the
unique characteristics of the Internet. Second, unlike the CDA, the
Commission's declaratory order was not punitive; we expressly refused
to decide whether the indecent broadcast "would justify a criminal
prosecution." Id., at 750. Finally, the Commission's order applied to a
medium which as a matter of history had "received the most limited
First Amendment protection," id., at 748, in large part because
warnings could not adequately protect the listener from unexpected
program content. The Internet, however, has no comparable history.
Moreover, the District Court found that the risk of encountering
indecent material by accident is remote because a series of affirmative
steps is required to access specific material.

In Renton, we upheld a zoning ordinance that kept adult movie theatres
out of residential neighborhoods. The ordinance was aimed, not at the
content of the films shown in the theaters, but rather at the
"secondary effects"--such as crime and deteriorating property
values--that these theaters fostered: " `It is th[e] secondary effect
which these zoning ordinances attempt to avoid, not the dissemination
of "offensive" speech.' " 475 U. S., at 49 (quoting Young v. American
Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71, n. 34 (1976)). According to the
Government, the CDA is constitutional because it constitutes a sort of
"cyberzoning" on the Internet. But the CDA applies broadly to the
entire universe of cyberspace. And the purpose of the CDA is to protect
children from the primary effects of "indecent" and "patently
offensive" speech, rather than any "secondary" effect of such speech.
Thus, the CDA is a content based blanket restriction on speech, and, as
such, cannot be "properly analyzed as a form of time, place, and manner
regulation." 475 U. S., at 46. See also Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312,
321 (1988) ("Regulations that focus on the direct impact of speech on
its audience" are not properly analyzed under Renton); Forsyth County
v=2E Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134 (1992) ("Listeners' reaction
to speech is not a content neutral basis for regulation").

These precedents, then, surely do not require us to uphold the CDA and
are fully consistent with the application of the moststringent review
of its provisions.




In Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975),
we observed that "[e]ach medium of expression . . . may present its own
problems." Thus, some of our cases have recognized special
justifications for regulation of the broadcast media that are not
applicable to other speakers, see Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395
U=2ES. 367 (1969); FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). In
these cases, the Court relied on the history of extensive government
regulation of the broadcast medium, see, e.g., Red Lion, 395 U. S., at
399-400; the scarcity of available frequencies at its inception, see,
e=2Eg., Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637-638
(1994); and its "invasive" nature, see Sable Communications of Cal.,
Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128 (1989).

Those factors are not present in cyberspace. Neither before nor after
the enactment of the CDA have the vast democratic fora of the Internet
been subject to the type of government supervision and regulation that
has attended the broadcast industry. [n.33] Moreover, the Internet is
not as "invasive" as radio or television. The District Court
specifically found that "[c]ommunications over the Internet do not
`invade' an individual's home or appear on one's computer screen
unbidden. Users seldom encounter content `by accident.' " 929 F. Supp.,
at844 (finding 88). It also found that "[a]lmost all sexually explicit
images are preceded by warnings as to the content," and cited testimony
that " `odds are slim' that a user would come across a sexually
explicit sight by accident." Ibid.

We distinguished Pacifica in Sable, 492 U. S., at 128, on just this
basis. In Sable, a company engaged in the business of offering sexually
oriented prerecorded telephone messages (popularly known as "dial a
porn") challenged the constitutionality of an amendment to the
Communications Act that imposed a blanket prohibition on indecent as
well as obscene interstate commercial telephone messages. We held that
the statute was constitutional insofar as it applied to obscene
messages but invalid as applied to indecent messages. In attempting to
justify the complete ban and criminalization of indecent commercial
telephone messages, the Government relied on Pacifica, arguing that the
ban was necessary to prevent children from gaining access to such
messages. We agreed that "there is a compelling interest in protecting
the physical and psychological well being of minors" which extended to
shielding them from indecent messages that are not obscene by adult
standards, 492 U. S., at 126, but distinguished our "emphatically
narrow holding" in Pacifica because it did not involve a complete ban
and because it involved a different medium of communication, id., at
127. We explained that "the dial it medium requires the listener to
take affirmative steps to receive the communication." Id., at 127-128.
"Placing a telephone call," we continued, "is not the same as turning
on a radio and being taken by surprise by an indecent message." Id., at
128.

Finally, unlike the conditions that prevailed when Congress first
authorized regulation of the broadcast spectrum, the Internet can
hardly be considered a "scarce" expressive commodity. It provides
relatively unlimited, low cost capacity for communication of allkinds.
The Government estimates that "[a]s many as 40 million people use the
Internet today, and that figure is expected to grow to 200 million by
1999." [n.34] This dynamic, multifaceted category of communication
includes not only traditional print and news services, but also audio,
video, and still images, as well as interactive, real time dialogue.
Through the use of chat rooms, any person with a phone line can become
a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any
soapbox. Through the use of Web pages, mail exploders, and newsgroups,
the same individual can become a pamphleteer. As the District Court
found, "the content on the Internet is as diverse as human thought."
929 F. Supp., at 842 (finding 74). We agree with its conclusion that
our cases provide no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment
scrutiny that should be applied to this medium.




Regardless of whether the CDA is so vague that it violates the Fifth
Amendment, the many ambiguities concerning the scope of its coverage
render it problematic for purposes of the First Amendment. For
instance, each of the two parts of the CDA uses a different linguistic
form. The first uses the word "indecent," 47 U. S. C. A. =A7223(a)
(Supp. 1997), while the second speaks of material that "in context,
depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by
contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or
organs," =A7223(d). Given the absence of a definition of either term,
[n.35] this difference in language will provokeuncertainty among
speakers about how the two standards relate to each other [n.36] and
just what they mean. [n.37] Could a spe aker confidently assume that a
serious discussion about birth control practices, homosexuality, the
First Amendment issues raised by the Appendix to our Pacifica opinion,
or the consequences of prison rape would not violate the CDA? This
uncertainty undermines the likelihood that the CDA has been carefully
tailored to the congressional goal of protecting minors from
potentially harmful materials.

The vagueness of the CDA is a matter of special concern for two
reasons. First, the CDA is a content based regulation of speech. The
vagueness of such a regulation raises special First Amendment concerns
because of its obvious chilling effect on free speech. See, e.g.,
Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1048-1051 (1991). Second,
the CDA is a criminal statute. In addition to the opprobrium and stigma
of a criminal conviction, the CDA threatens violators with penalties
including up to two years in prison for each act of violation. The
severity of criminal sanctions may well cause speakers to remain silent
rather than communicate even arguably unlawful words, ideas, and
images. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 494 (1965). As
a practical matter, this increased deterrent effect, coupled with the
"risk of discriminatory enforcement" of vague regulations, poses
greater First Amendment concerns than those implicated by the civil
regulation reviewed in Denver Area Ed. Telecommunications Consortium,
Inc. v. FCC, 518 U. S. ___ (1996).

The Government argues that the statute is no more vague than the
obscenity standard this Court established in Millerv. California, 413
U=2ES. 15 (1973). But that is not so. In Miller, this Court reviewed a
criminal conviction against a commercial vendor who mailed brochures
containing pictures of sexually explicit activities to individuals who
had not requested such materials. Id., at 18. Having struggled for some
time to establish a definition of obscenity, we set forth in Miller the
test for obscenity that controls to this day:

"(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community
standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." Id., at 24
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Because the CDA's "patently offensive" standard (and, we assume
arguendo, its synonymous "indecent" standard) is one part of the three
prong Miller test, the Government reasons, it cannot be
unconstitutionally vague.

The Government's assertion is incorrect as a matter of fact. The second
prong of the Miller test--the purportedly analogous standard--contains
a critical requirement that is omitted from the CDA: that the
proscribed material be "specifically defined by the applicable state
law." This requirement reduces the vagueness inherent in the open ended
term "patently offensive" as used in the CDA. Moreover, the Miller
definition is limited to "sexual conduct," whereas the CDA extends also
to include (1) "excretory activities" as well as (2) "organs" of both a
sexual and excretory nature.

The Government's reasoning is also flawed. Just because a definition
including three limitations is not vague, it does not follow that one
of those limitations, standing by itself, is not vague. [n.38] Each of
Miller's additional two prongs--(1) that, taken as a whole, the
material appeal to the "prurient" interest, and (2) that it "lac[k]
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value"--critically
limits the uncertain sweep of the obscenity definition. The second
requirement is particularly important because, unlike the "patently
offensive" and "prurient interest" criteria, it is not judged by
contemporary community standards. See Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497,
500 (1987). This "societal value" requirement, absent in the CDA,
allows appellate courts to impose some limitations and regularity on
the definition by setting, as a matter of law, a national floor for
socially redeeming value. The Government's contention that courts will
be able to give such legal limitations to the CDA's standards is belied
by Miller's own rationale for having juries determine whether material
is "patently offensive" according to community standards: that such
questions are essentially ones of fact. [n.39]

In contrast to Miller and our other previous cases, the CDA thus
presents a greater threat of censoring speech that, in fact, falls
outside the statute's scope. Given the vague contours of the coverage
of the statute, it unquestionably silences some speakers whose messages
would be entitled to constitutional protection. That danger provides
further reason for insisting that the statute not be overly broad. The
CDA's burden on protected speech cannot be justified if it could be
avoided by a more carefully drafted statute.




We are persuaded that the CDA lacks the precision that the First
Amendment requires when a statute regulates the content of speech. In
order to deny minors access to potentially harmful speech, the CDA
effectively suppresses a large amount of speech that adults have a
constitutional right to receive and to address to one another. That
burden on adult speech is unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives
would be at least as effective in achieving the legitimate purpose that
the statute was enacted to serve.

In evaluating the free speech rights of adults, we have made it
perfectly clear that "[s]exual expression which is indecent but not
obscene is protected by the First Amendment." Sable, 492 U. S., at 126.
See also Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 701 (1977)
("[W]here obscenity is not involved, we have consistentlyheld that the
fact that protected speech may be offensive to some does not justify
its suppression"). Indeed, Pacifica itself


admonished that "the fact that society may find speech offensive is not
a sufficient reason for suppressing it." 438 U. S., at 745.

It is true that we have repeatedly recognized the governmental interest
in protecting children from harmful materials. See Ginsberg, 390 U. S.,
at 639; Pacifica, 438 U. S., at 749. But that interest does not justify
an unnecessarily broad suppression of speech addressed to adults. As we
have explained, the Government may not "reduc[e] the adult population .
.. . to . . . only what is fit for children." Denver, 518 U. S., at ___
(slip op., at 29) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sable,
492 U. S., at 128). [n.40] "[R]egardless of the strength of the
government's interest" in protecting children, "[t]he level of
discourse reaching a mailbox simply cannot be limited to that which
would be suitable for a sandbox." Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.,
463 U.S. 60, 74-75 (1983).

The District Court was correct to conclude that the CDA effectively
resembles the ban on "dial a porn" invalidated in Sable. 929 F. Supp.,
at 854. In Sable, 492 U. S., at 129, this Court rejected the argument
that we should defer to the congressional judgment that nothing less
than a total ban would be effective in preventing enterprising
youngsters from gaining access to indecent communications. Sable thus
made clear that the mere fact that a statutory regulation of speech was
enactedfor the important purpose of protecting children from exposure
to sexually explicit material does not foreclose inquiry into its
validity. [n.41] As we pointed out last Term, that inquiry embodies an
"over arching commitment" to make sure that Congress has designed its
statute to accomplish its purpose "without imposing an unnecessarily
great restriction on speech." Denver, 518 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at
11).

In arguing that the CDA does not so diminish adult communication, the
Government relies on the incorrect factual premise that prohibiting a
transmission whenever it is known that one of its recipients is a minor
would not interfere with adult to adult communication. The findings of
the District Court make clear that this premise is untenable.


Given the size of the potential audience for most messages, in the
absence of a viable age verification process, the sender must be
charged with knowing that one or more minors will likely view it.
Knowledge that, for instance, one or more members of a 100 person chat
group will be minor--and therefore that it would be a crime to send the
group an indecent message--would surely burden communication among
adults. [n.42]

The District Court found that at the time of trial existing technology
did not include any effective method for a sender to prevent minors
from obtaining access to its communications on the Internet without
also denying access to adults. The Court found no effective way to
determine the age of a user who is accessing material through e mail,
mail exploders, newsgroups, or chat rooms. 929 F. Supp., at 845
(findings 90-94). As a practical matter, the Court also found that it
would be prohibitively expensive for noncommercial--as well as some
commercial--speakers who have Web sites to verify that their users are
adults. Id., at 845-848 (findings 95-116). [n.43] These limitations
must inevitably curtail a significant amount of adult communication on
the Internet. By contrast, the District Court found that "[d]espite its
limitations, currently available user based software suggests that a
reasonably effective method by which parents can prevent their children
from accessing sexually explicit and other material which parents may
believe is inappropriate for their children will soon be widely
available." Id., at 842 (finding 73) (emphases added).

The breadth of the CDA's coverage is wholly unprecedented. Unlike the
regulations upheld in Ginsberg and Pacifica, the scope of the CDA is
not limited to commercial speech or commercial entities. Its open ended
prohibitions embrace all nonprofit entities and individuals posting
indecent messages or displaying them on their own computers in the
presence of minors. The general,undefined terms "indecent" and
"patently offensive" cover large amounts of nonpornographic material
with serious educational or other value. [n.44] Moreover, the
"community standards" criterion as applied to the Internet means that
any communication available to a nation wide audience will be judged by
the standards of the community most likely to be offended by the
message. [n.45] The regulated subject matter includes any of the seven
"dirty words" used in the Pacifica monologue, the use of which the
Government's expert acknowledged could constitute a felony. See Olsen
Test., Tr. Vol. V, 53:16-54:10. It may also extend to discussions about
prison rape or safe sexual practices, artistic images that include nude
subjects, and arguably the card catalogue of the Carnegie Library.

For the purposes of our decision, we need neither accept nor reject the
Government's submission that the First Amendment does not forbid a
blanket prohibition on all "indecent" and "patently offensive" messages
communicated to a 17 year old--no matter how much valuethe message may
contain and regardless of parental approval. It is at least clear that
the strength of the Government's interest in protecting minors is not
equally strong throughout the coverage of this broad statute. Under the
CDA, a parent allowing her 17 year old to use the family computer to
obtain information on the Internet that she, in her parental judgment,
deems appropriate could face a lengthy prison term. See 47 U. S. C. A.
=A7223(a)(2) (Supp. 1997). Similarly, a parent who sent his 17 year old
college freshman information on birth control via e mail could be
incarcerated even though neither he, his child, nor anyone in their
home community, found the material "indecent" or "patently offensive,"
if the college town's community thought otherwise.

The breadth of this content based restriction of speech imposes an
especially heavy burden on the Government to explain why a less
restrictive provision would not be as effective as the CDA. It has not
done so. The arguments in this Court have referred to possible
alternatives such as requiring that indecent material be "tagged" in a
way that facilitates parental control of material coming into their
homes, making exceptions for messages with artistic or educational
value, providing some tolerance for parental choice, and regulating
some portions of the Internet--such as commercial web
sites--differently than others, such as chat rooms. Particularly in the
light of the absence of any detailed findings by the Congress, or even
hearings addressing the special problems of the CDA, we are persuaded
that the CDA is not narrowly tailored if that requirement has any
meaning at all.




In an attempt to curtail the CDA's facial overbreadth, the Government
advances three additional arguments for sustaining the Act's
affirmative prohibitions: (1) thatthe CDA is constitutional because it
leaves open ample "alternative channels" of communication; (2) that the
plain meaning of the Act's "knowledge" and "specific person"
requirement significantly restricts its permissible applications; and
(3) that the Act's prohibitions are "almost always" limited to material
lacking redeeming social value.

The Government first contends that, even though the CDA effectively
censors discourse on many of the Internet's modalities--such as chat
groups, newsgroups, and mail exploders--it is nonetheless
constitutional because it provides a "reasonable opportunity" for
speakers to engage in the restricted speech on the World Wide Web.
Brief for Appellants 39. This argument is unpersuasive because the CDA
regulates speech on the basis of its content. A "time, place, and
manner" analysis is therefore inapplicable. See Consolidated Edison Co.
of N. Y. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N. Y., 447 U.S. 530, 536 (1980). It
is thus immaterial whether such speech would be feasible on the Web
(which, as the Government's own expert acknowledged, would cost up to
$10,000 if the speaker's interests were not accommodated by an existing
Web site, not including costs for database management and age
verification). The Government's position is equivalent to arguing that
a statute could ban leaflets on certain subjects as long as individuals
are free to publish books. In invalidating a number of laws that banned
leafletting on the streets regardless of their content--we explained
that "one is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in
appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in
some other place." Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U.S.
147, 163 (1939).

The Government also asserts that the "knowledge" requirement of both
=A7=A7223(a) and (d), especially when coupled with the "specific child"
element found in =A7223(d), saves the CDA from overbreadth. Because
bothsections prohibit the dissemination of indecent messages only to
persons known to be under 18, the Government argues, it does not
require transmitters to "refrain from communicating indecent material
to adults; they need only refrain from disseminating such materials to
persons they know to be under 18." Brief for Appellants 24. This
argument ignores the fact that most Internet fora--including chat
rooms, newsgroups, mail exploders, and the Web--are open to all comers.
The Government's assertion that the knowledge requirement somehow
protects the communications of adults is therefore untenable. Even the
strongest reading of the "specific person" requirement of =A7223(d)
cannot save the statute. It would confer broad powers of censorship, in
the form of a "heckler's veto," upon any opponent of indecent speech
who might simply log on and inform the would be discoursers that his 17
year old child--a "specific person . . . under 18 years of age," 47 U.
S=2E C. A. =A7223(d)(1)(A) (Supp. 1997)--would be present.

Finally, we find no textual support for the Government's submission
that material having scientific, educational, or other redeeming social
value will necessarily fall outside the CDA's "patently offensive" and
"indecent" prohibitions. See also n. 37, supra.




The Government's three remaining arguments focus on the defenses
provided in =A7223(e)(5). [n.46] First, relying on the "good faith,
reasonable, effective, and appropriate actions" provision, the
Government suggests that "tagging" provides a defense that saves the
constitutionality of the Act. The suggestion assumes that transmitters
may encode their indecent communications in a way that would indicate
their contents, thus permitting recipients to block their reception
with appropriatesoftware. It is the requirement that the good faith
action must be "effective" that makes this defense illusory. The
Government recognizes that its proposed screening software does not
currently exist. Even if it did, there is no way to know whether a
potential recipient will actually block the encoded material. Without
the impossible knowledge that every guardian in America is screening
for the "tag," the transmitter could not reasonably rely on its action
to be "effective."

For its second and third arguments concerning defenses--which we can
consider together--the Government relies on the latter half of
=A7223(e)(5), which applies when the transmitter has restricted access
by requiring use of a verified credit card or adult identification.
Such verification is not only technologically available but actually is
used by commercial providers of sexually explicit material. These
providers, therefore, would be protected by the defense. Under the
findings of the District Court, however, it is not economically
feasible for most noncommercial speakers to employ such verification.
Accordingly, this defense would not significantly narrow the statute's
burden on noncommercial speech. Even with respect to the commercial
pornographers that would be protected by the defense, the Government
failed to adduce any evidence that these verification techniques
actually preclude minors from posing as adults. [n.47] Given that the
risk of criminal sanctions "hovers over each content provider, like the
proverbial sword of Damocles," [n.48] the District Court correctly
refused to rely on unproven future technology to save the statute. The
Government thus failed to prove that theproffered defense would
significantly reduce the heavy burden on adult speech produced by the
prohibition on offensive displays.

We agree with the District Court's conclusion that the CDA places an
unacceptably heavy burden on protected speech, and that the defenses do
not constitute the sort of "narrow tailoring" that will save an
otherwise patently invalid unconstitutional provision. In Sable, 492 U.
S=2E, at 127, we remarked that the speech restriction at issue there
amounted to " `burn[ing] the house to roast the pig.' " The CDA,
casting a far darker shadow over free speech, threatens to torch a
large segment of the Internet community.




At oral argument, the Government relied heavily on its ultimate fall
back position: If this Court should conclude that the CDA is
insufficiently tailored, it urged, we should save the statute's
constitutionality by honoring the severability clause, see 47 U.S.C. =A7
608 and construing nonseverable terms narrowly. In only one respect is
this argument acceptable.

A severability clause requires textual provisions that can be severed.
We will follow =A7608's guidance by leaving constitutional textual
elements of the statute intact in the one place where they are, in
fact, severable. The "indecency" provision, 47 U. S. C. A. =A7223(a)
(Supp. 1997), applies to "any comment, request, suggestion, proposal,
image, or other communication which is obscene or indecent." (Emphasis
added.) Appellees do not challenge the application of the statute to
obscene speech, which, they acknowledge, can be banned totally because
it enjoys no First Amendment protection. See Miller, 413 U. S., at 18.
As set forth by the statute, the restriction of "obscene" material
enjoys a textual manifestation separate from that for "indecent"
material, which we have held unconstitutional. Therefore, we willsever
the term "or indecent" from the statute, leaving the rest of =A7223(a)
standing. In no other respect, however, can =A7223(a) or =A7223(d) be
saved by such a textual surgery.

The Government also draws on an additional, less traditional aspect of
the CDA's severability clause, 47 U. S. C., =A7608, which asks any
reviewing court that holds the statute facially unconstitutional not to
invalidate the CDA in application to "other persons or circumstances"
that might be constitutionally permissible. It further invokes this
Court's admonition that, absent "countervailing considerations," a
statute should "be declared invalid to the extent it reaches too far,
but otherwise left intact." Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S.
491, 503-504 (1985). There are two flaws in this argument.

First, the statute that grants our jurisdiction for this expedited
review, 47 U. S. C. A. =A7561 (Supp. 1997), limits that jurisdictional
grant to actions challenging the CDA "on its face." Consistent with
=A7561, the plaintiffs who brought this suit and the three judge panel
that decided it treated it as a facial challenge. We have no authority,
in this particular posture, to convert this litigation into an "as
applied" challenge. Nor, given the vast array of plaintiffs, the range
of their expressive activities, and the vagueness of the statute, would
it be practicable to limit our holding to a judicially defined set of
specific applications.

Second, one of the "countervailing considerations" mentioned in
Brockett is present here. In considering a facial challenge, this Court
may impose a limiting construction on a statute only if it is "readily
susceptible" to such a construction. Virginia v. American Bookseller's
Assn., Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 397 (1988). See also Erznoznik, v.
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216 (1975) ("readily subject" to narrowing
construction). The open ended character of the CDA provides no guidance
whatever for limiting its coverage.

This case is therefore unlike those in which we have construed a
statute narrowly because the text or other source of congressional
intent identified a clear line that this Court could draw. Cf., e.g.,
Brockett, 472 U. S., at 504-505 (invalidating obscenity statute only to
the extent that word "lust" was actually or effectively excised from
statute); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180-183 (1983)
(invalidating federal statute banning expressive displays only insofar
as it extended to public sidewalks when clear line could be drawn
between sidewalks and other grounds that comported with congressional
purpose of protecting the building, grounds, and people therein).
Rather, our decision in United States v. Treasury Employees, 513 U.S.
454, 479, n. 26 (1995), is applicable. In that case, we declined to
"dra[w] one or more lines between categories of speech covered by an
overly broad statute, when Congress has sent inconsistent signals as to
where the new line or lines should be drawn" because doing so "involves
a far more serious invasion of the legislative domain." [n.49] This
Court "will not rewrite a . . . law to conform it to constitutional
requirements." American Booksellers, 484 U. S., at 397. [n.50]




In this Court, though not in the District Court, the Government asserts
that--in addition to its interest in protecting children--its
"[e]qually significant" interest in fostering the growth of the
Internet provides an independent basis for upholding the
constitutionality of the CDA. Brief for Appellants 19. The Government
apparently assumes that the unregulated availability of "indecent" and
"patently offensive" material on the Internet is driving countless
citizens away from the medium because of the risk of exposing
themselves or their children to harmful material.

We find this argument singularly unpersuasive. The dramatic expansion
of this new marketplace of ideas contradicts the factual basis of this
contention. The record demonstrates that the growth of the Internet has
been and continues to be phenomenal. As a matter of constitutional
tradition, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume that
governmental regulation of the content of speech is more likely to
interfere with the free exchange of ideas than to encourage it. The
interest in encouraging freedom of expression in a democratic society
outweighs any theoretical but unproven benefit of censorship.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is
affirmed.

It is so ordered.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Notes
1 "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech."
U=2E S. Const., Amdt. 1.

2 The Court made 410 findings, including 356 paragraphs of the parties'
stipulation and 54 findings based on evidence received in open court.
See 929 F. Supp. at 830, n. 9, 842, n. 15.

3 An acronym for the network developed by the Advanced Research Project
Agency.

4 Id., at 844 (finding 81).

5 Id., at 831 (finding 3).

6 Id., at 835 (finding 27).

7 Id., at 842 (finding 74).

8 Id., at 836 (finding 36).

9 "Web publishing is simple enough that thousands of individual users
and small community organizations are using the Web to publish their
own personal `home pages,' the equivalent of individualized newsletters
about the person or organization, which are available to everyone on
the Web." Id., at 837 (finding 42).

10 Id., at 838 (finding 46).

11 Id., at 844 (finding 82).

12 Ibid. (finding 86).

13 Ibid. (finding 85).

14 Id., at 848 (finding 117).

15 Id., at 844-845 (finding 88).

16 Ibid.

17 Id., at 845 (finding 89).

18 Id., at 842 (finding 72).

19 Ibid. (finding 73).

20 Id., at 845 (finding 90): "An e mail address provides no
authoritative information about the addressee, who may use an e mail
`alias' or an anonymous remailer. There is also no universal or
reliable listing of e mail addresses and corresponding names or
telephone numbers, and any such listing would be or rapidly become
incomplete. For these reasons, there is no reliable way in many
instances for a sender to know if the e mail recipient is an adult or a
minor. The difficulty of e mail age verification is compounded for mail
exploders such as listservs, which automatically send information to
all e mail addresses on a sender's list. Government expert Dr. Olsen
agreed that no current technology could give a speaker assurance that
only adults were listed in a particular mail exploder's mailing list."

21 Ibid. (finding 93).

22 Id., at 846 (finding 102).

23 Id., at 847 (findings 104-106):

"At least some, if not almost all, non commercial organizations, such
as the ACLU, Stop Prisoner Rape or Critical Path AIDS Project, regard
charging listeners to access their speech as contrary to their goals of
making their materials available to a wide audience free of charge.

.. . . . .

"There is evidence suggesting that adult users, particularly casual Web
browsers, would be discouraged from retrieving information that
required use of a credit card or password. Andrew Anker testified that
HotWired has received many complaints from its members about HotWired's
registration system, which requires only that a member supply a name, e
mail address and self created password. There is concern by commercial
content providers that age verification requirements would decrease
advertising and revenue because advertisers depend on a demonstration
that the sites arewidely available and frequently visited."

24 See Exon Amendment No. 1268, 141 Cong. Rec. S8120 (June 9, 1995).
See also id., at S8087. This amendment, as revised, became=A7502 of the
Communications Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 133, 47 U. S. C. A.
=A7=A7223(a)%(e) (Supp. 1997). Some Members of the House of
Representatives opposed the Exon Amendment because they thought it
"possible for our parents now to child proof the family computer with
these products available in the private sector." They also thought the
Senate's approach would "involve the Federal Government spending vast
sums of money trying to define elusive terms that are going to lead to
a flood of legal challenges while our kids are unprotected." These
Members offered an amendment intended as a substitute for the Exon
Amendment, but instead enacted as an additional section of the Act
entitled "Online Family Empowerment." See 110 Stat. 137, 47 U. S. C. A.
=A7230 (Supp. 1997); 141 Cong. Rec. H8468-H8472. No hearings were held
on the provisions that became law. See S. Rep. No. 104-23 (1995), p. 9.
After the Senate adopted the Exon amendment, however, its Judiciary
Committee did conduct a one day hearing on "Cyberporn and Children." In
his opening statement at that hearing, Senator Leahy observed:

"It really struck me in your opening statement when you mentioned, Mr.
Chairman, that it is the first ever hearing, and you are absolutely
right. And yet we had a major debate on the floor, passed legislation
overwhelmingly on a subject involving the Internet, legislation that
could dramatically change--some would say even wreak havoc--on the
Internet. The Senate went in willy nilly, passed legislation, and never
once had a hearing, never once had a discussion other than an hour or
so on the floor." Cyberporn and Children: The Scope of the Problem, The
State of the Technology, and the Need for Congressional Action, Hearing
on S. 892 before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 104th Cong.,
1st Sess., 7-8 (1995).

25 Although the Government and the dissent break =A7223(d)(1) into two
separate "patently offensive" and "display" provisions, we follow the
convention of both parties below, as well the District Court's order
and opinion, in describing =A7223(d)(1) as one provision.

26 In full, =A7 223(e)(5) provides:

"(5) It is a defense to a prosecution under subsection (a)(1)(B) or (d)
of this section, or under subsection (a)(2) of this section with
respect to the use of a facility for an activity under subsection
(a)(1)(B) of this section that a person--

"(A) has taken, in good faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate
actions under the circumstances to restrict or prevent access by minors
to a communication specified in such subsections, which may involve any
appropriate measures to restrict minors from such communications,
including any method which is feasible under available technology; or

"(B) has restricted access to such communication by requiring use of a
verified credit card, debit account, adult access code, or adult
personal identification number."

27 American Civil Liberties Union; Human Rights Watch; Electronic
Privacy Information Center; Electronic Frontier Foundation; Journalism
Education Association; Computer Professionals for Social
Responsibility; National Writers Union; Clarinet Communications Corp.;
Institute for Global Communications; Stop Prisoner Rape; AIDS Education
Global Information System; Bibliobytes; Queer Resources Directory;
Critical Path AIDS Project, Inc.; Wildcat Press, Inc.; Declan McCullagh
dba Justice on Campus; Brock Meeks dba Cyberwire Dispatch; John Troyer
dba The Safer Sex Page; JonathanWallace dba The Ethical Spectacle; and
Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc.

28 American Library Association; America Online, Inc.; American
Booksellers Association, Inc.; American Booksellers Foundation for Free
Expression; American Society of Newspaper Editors; Apple Computer,
Inc.; Association of American Publishers, Inc.; Association of
Publishers, Editors and Writers; Citizens Internet Empowerment
Coalition; Commercial Internet Exchange Association; CompuServe
Incorporated; Families Against Internet Censorship; Freedom to Read
Foundation, Inc.; Health Sciences Libraries Consortium; Hotwired
Ventures LLC; Interactive Digital Software Association; Interactive
Services Association; Magazine Publishers of America; Microsoft
Corporation; The Microsoft Network, L. L. C.; National Press
Photographers Association; Netcom On Line Communication Services, Inc.;
Newspaper Association of America; Opnet, Inc.; Prodigy Services
Company; Society of Professional Journalists; Wired Ventures, Ltd.

29 110 Stat. 142-143, note following 47 U. S. C. A. =A7223 (Supp.1997).

30 See also 929 F. Supp., at 877: "Four related characteristics of
Internet communication have a transcendent importance to our shared
holding that the CDA is unconstitutional on its face. We explain these
characteristics in our Findings of fact above, and I only rehearse them
briefly here. First, the Internet presents very low barriers to entry.
Second, these barriers to entry are identical for both speakers and
listeners. Third, as a result of these low barriers, astoundingly
diverse content is available on the Internet. Fourth, the Internet
provides significant access to all who wish to speak in the medium, and
even creates a relative parity among speakers." According to Judge
Dalzell, these characteristics and therest of the District Court's
findings "lead to the conclusion that Congress may not regulate
indecency on the Internet at all." Ibid. Because appellees do not press
this argument before this Court, we do not consider it. Appellees also
do not dispute that the Government generally has a compelling interest
in protecting minors from "indecent" and "patently offensive" speech.

31 390 U. S., at 639. We quoted from Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 166 (1944): "It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and
nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary
function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can
neither supply nor hinder."

32 Given the likelihood that many E mail transmissions from an adult to
a minor are conversations between family members, it is therefore
incorrect for the dissent to suggest that the provisions of the CDA,
even in this narrow area, "are no different from the lawwe sustained in
Ginsberg." Post, at 8.

33 Cf. Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, 556 F. 2d 9, 36 (CADC 1977)
(Levanthal, J., dissenting), rev'd, FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438
U=2ES. 726 (1978). When Pacifica was decided, given that radio stations
were allowed to operate only pursuant to federal license, and that
Congress had enacted legislation prohibiting licensees from
broadcasting indecent speech, there was a risk that members of the
radio audience might infer some sort of official or societal approval
of whatever was heard over the radio, see 556 F. 2d, at 37, n. 18. No
such risk attends messages received through the Internet, which is not
supervised by any federal agency.

34 Juris. Statement 3 (citing 929 F. Supp., at 831 (finding 3)).

35 "Indecent" does not benefit from any textual embellishment at all.
"Patently offensive" is qualified only to the extent that it involves
"sexual or excretory activities or organs" taken "in context" and
"measured by contemporary community standards."

36 See Gozlon Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 404 (1991) ("Where
Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but
omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed
that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate
inclusion and exclusion") (internal quotation marks omitted).

37 The statute does not indicate whether the "patently offensive" and
"indecent" determinations should be made with respect to minors or the
population as a whole. The Government asserts that the appropriate
standard is "what is suitable material for minors." Reply Brief for
Appellants 18, n. 13 (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 633
(1968)). But the Conferees expressly rejected amendments that would
have imposed such a "harmful to minors" standard. See S. Conf. Rep. No.
104-230, p. 189 (1996) (S. Conf. Rep.), 142 Cong. Rec. H1145,
H1165-1166 (Feb. 1, 1996). The Conferees also rejected amendments that
would have limited the proscribed materials to those lacking redeeming
value. See S. Conf. Rep., at 189, 142 Cong. Rec. H1165-1166 (Feb. 1,
1996).

38 Even though the word "trunk," standing alone, might refer to
luggage, a swimming suit, the base of a tree, or the long nose of an
animal, its meaning is clear when it is one prong of a three part
description of a species of gray animals.

39 413 U. S., at 30 (Determinations of "what appeals to the `prurient
interest' or is `patently offensive'. . . . are essentially questions
of fact, and our Nation is simply too big and too diverse for this
Court to reasonably expect that such standards could be articulated for
all 50 States in a single formulation, even assuming the prerequisite
consensus exists"). The CDA, which implements the "contemporary
community standards" language of Miller, thus conflicts with the
Conferees' own assertion that the CDA was intended "to establish a
uniform national standard of content regulation." S. Conf. Rep., at
191.

40 Accord, Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957) (ban on sale to
adults of books deemed harmful to children unconstitutional); Sable
Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128 (1989) (ban on
"dial a porn" messages unconstitutional); Bolger v. Youngs Drug
Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 73 (1983) (ban on mailing of unsolicited
advertisement for contraceptives unconstitutional).

41 The lack of legislative attention to the statute at issue in Sable
suggests another parallel with this case. Compare 492 U. S., at 129-130
("[A]side from conclusory statements during the debates by proponents
of the bill, as well as similar assertions in hearings on a
substantially identical bill the year before, . . . the congressional
record presented to us contains no evidence as to how effective or
ineffective the FCC's most recent regulations were or might prove to
be. . . . No Congressman or Senator purported to present a considered
judgment with respect to how often or to what extent minors could or
would circumvent the rules and have access to dial a porn messages")
with n. 24, supra.

42 The Government agrees that these provisions are applicable whenever
"a sender transmits a message to more than one recipient, knowing that
at least one of the specific persons receiving themessage is a minor."
Opposition to Motion to Affirm and Reply to Juris. Statement 4-5, n. 1.

43 The Government asserts that "[t]here is nothing constitutionally
suspect about requiring commercial Web site operators . . . to shoulder
the modest burdens associated with their use." Brief for Appellants 35.
As a matter of fact, however, there is no evidence that a "modest
burden" would be effective.

44 Transmitting obscenity and child pornography, whether via the
Internet or other means, is already illegal under federal law for both
adults and juveniles. See 18 U.S.C. =A7=A7 1464-1465 (criminalizing
obscenity); =A72251 (criminalizing child pornography). In fact, when
Congress was considering the CDA, the Government expressed its view
that the law was unnecessary because existing laws already authorized
its ongoing efforts to prosecute obscenity, child pornography, and
child solicitation. See 141 Cong. Rec. S8342 (June 14, 1995) (letter
from Kent Markus, Acting Assistant Attorney General,U. S. Department of
Justice, to Sen. Leahy).

45 Citing Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520
(1993), among other cases, appellees offer an additional reason why, in
their view, the CDA fails strict scrutiny. Because so much sexually
explicit content originates overseas, they argue, the CDA cannot be
"effective." Brief for Appellees American Library Association et al.
33-34. This argument raises difficult issues regarding the intended, as
well as the permissible scope of, extraterritorial application of the
CDA. We find it unnecessary to address those issues to dispose of this
case.

46 For the full text of =A7223(e)(5), see n. 26, supra.

47 Thus, ironically, this defense may significantly protect commercial
purveyors of obscene postings while providing little (or no) benefit
for transmitters of indecent messages that have significant social or
artistic value.

48 929 F. Supp., at 855-856.

49 As this Court long ago explained, "It would certainly be dangerous
if the Legislature could set a net large enough to catch all possible
offenders and leave it to the courts to step inside and say who could
be rightfully be detained and who should be set at large. This would,
to some extent, substitute the judicial for the legislative department
of the government." United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1876). In
part because of these separation of powers concerns, we have held that
a severability clause is "an aid merely; not an inexorable command."
Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286, 290 (1924).

50 See also Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 121 (1990) (judicial
rewriting of statutes would derogate Congress's "incentive to draft a
narrowly tailored law in the first place").

  #37   Report Post  
Old May 2nd 05, 06:21 PM
Mel A. Nomah
 
Posts: n/a
Default

"Bill Sohl" wrote in message
nk.net...

:
: Yet we all know yelling "fire" in a theater is illegal and forbidden by
: law...
:

Show us the law.

Freedom of speech gives you the right. That doesn't mean you -do- that, it
means you -have the freedom to do- that, which is an excellent freedom to
have available if you should happen to see a fire in a theater.

Practically, if you hear someone yell "FIRE!" then you have some decisions
to make. Are you going to believe that person or not, especially when you
see nothing? If you do believe this person, are you going to run for the
door like a crazed animal, or quickly make your way to the exit in a
civilized manner?

Whichever you choose, it's -your- choice and -your- responsibility. It
is -not- the responsibility of the person who yelled "FIRE!" that -you-
chose one direction or another.

Thinking that it is the responsibility of the person who yelled "FIRE!"
strips your power away from you and makes you not responsible for your
life. Is that what you want?

73,

M.A.N.
--
"I have never made but one prayer to God, a very short one: "O Lord,
make my enemies ridiculous." And God granted it."
- Voltaire


  #38   Report Post  
Old May 2nd 05, 06:29 PM
K4YZ
 
Posts: n/a
Default


N9OGL wrote:
I never said you used it for commercial purposes. I never said
you use profanity on the air...I said you have to POTENTIAL to be

the
same potty mouth on the air as you are here.


Don't assume anything stevey, despite what YOU think the internet and
radio are two different media's are are regulated differently. What

you
can not say on the radio you can say on the internet.

I'll ignore the rest of the crap you wrote.


Of course you will...You can't answer any of it in any meaningful
way that DOESN'T make you look like a fool...so take the easy way out.

Steve, K4YZ

  #39   Report Post  
Old May 2nd 05, 06:51 PM
K4YZ
 
Posts: n/a
Default


N9OGL wrote:
Steve,

An "information bulletin" that you refer to as a "show". A "show"
that is nothing more than a showcase for your rhetoric..


Despite what you hink steve and information bulletin doesn't have to

be
a "newscast" it only has to be directed only to amteur radio

operators
consisting solely of subject matter of direct interest to the amateur
service.


You'd best read up on what a "bulletin" is, Todd.

You're broadcasting a show.

Todd...I gave you a "pass" on this the first time around because I
know it was too easy for you to get confused with everything going
on...


You ARE promoting wanton violation of FCC rules and regulations.
You have stated, on numerous occassions, that you operated both a
"pirate" TV and FM station...You've said you'd do it again.


First off I never ran a Pirate radio station...(SNIP)


Then you're lying to SOMEone, Todd, because there's a ton of
messages with you bragging about your illegal stations. Including a
ton of messages signed off with your "pirate" station ID.

Some of those copied messages are on THEIR way to Washington.
Some are on their way to Springfield.

I wonder how much "support" you're going to get once some office
staffer starts to "research" those links...?!?!

I applied for a LPFM license...(SNIP)


So you did. And the FCC wisely denied it.

Secondly that's between me and the FCC...(SNIP)


Wrong.

ANY...repeat ANY application for licensure by the Federal
Communications Commission is a matter of public record. Whether it's
for a broadcast license, an Amateur license, GMRS, etc.

and as I stated before
they will NOT doing anything about, and finally You don't know what

the
HELL was going on so I suggest you shut your ####ing mouth, that does
concern you.


Well, Todd...You A L M O S T made it 24 hours without resorting
to potty mouth.

A N Y T H I N G Todd Daugherty does with a radio transmitter that
isn't under the control of the NTIA, the Armed Forces, or the
security/intel agencies D O E S concern me.

Ask the FCC.

And I provided links to YOUR assertions of the aforementioned
"pirate" operations. Along with your gross profanities, razor blade
comments, references to my deceased daughter, etc etc etc.
Civil people don't act that way, Todd, and your ISP agreed. You
were warned but blew it off.


First off you taking the razor blade too serious....


I tend to take razor blades seriously, Todd.

I don't you name in
that post and was not directed towards you directly. The problem with
service porviders is they only respond to complaints they don't
investigate the complaint. if my ISP was on here and realize what a
PRICK you are perhaps they would change their mine.


Perhaps they'd see what kind of language you use and how
absolutely assinine your rants are.

And hey, what happened to the 7th grader that so eloquently
prepared that other post....?!?!

You really had me going for a while there!

You SAY it's legal. We have no evidence of it. You randymouthed
other correspondents about being "appliance operators", yet when

tasked
to list YOUR station, you balked


Below there is a link to the FCC website where you and others on this
website can read all about information bulletins

http://wireless.fcc.gov/services/ama...nications.html


You know what...It's no wonder you can't keep a civil or organized
thought in your head, Todd.

We were talking about your STATION...Not your shows.

The harrassing one already got booted, Todd. At least for a
while...The one who signed your name and call yesterday was actually
polite and civil. Was that you, or did you give someone your
password...?!?!


Well steve on a final note I hope that people on this newsgroup wise

up
and get sick of your harassment and boot your sorry ### off the
newsgroup


There's been far worse than me here, Todd. Strangely enough all
the ner-do-well's have originated in Illinois.

Why is that?

Steve, K4YZ

  #40   Report Post  
Old May 2nd 05, 06:53 PM
K4YZ
 
Posts: n/a
Default


N9OGL wrote:
Well Hans Information bulletins are legal and there's really nothing
anyone can do about it. I'm currently working with the House
Subcommittee on Telecommunication to resolve this information

bulletin
problem.


The "problem", Todd, is that you are part of the problem.

And I wouldn't hold out too much hope for much help from "The
House" any more, Todd...Especially after they get a look at your USENET
track record.

Good luck.

Steve, K4YZ

Reply
Thread Tools Search this Thread
Search this Thread:

Advanced Search
Display Modes

Posting Rules

Smilies are On
[IMG] code is On
HTML code is Off
Trackbacks are On
Pingbacks are On
Refbacks are On


Similar Threads
Thread Thread Starter Forum Replies Last Post
Which Todd Do We Believe...??? K4YZ Policy 2 April 28th 05 01:05 AM
K4YZ ANSWER MY QUESTION N9OGL Policy 27 April 21st 05 10:37 PM
Boy broadcaster N9OGL - Part One Dave Heil Policy 65 April 12th 05 02:55 PM
Todd Faking "Responses" to Posts On His Blog K4YZ Policy 4 April 11th 05 08:07 AM
Boy Broadcaster N9OGL - Part II Dave Heil Policy 40 April 10th 05 01:41 PM


All times are GMT +1. The time now is 01:03 PM.

Powered by vBulletin® Copyright ©2000 - 2024, Jelsoft Enterprises Ltd.
Copyright ©2004-2024 RadioBanter.
The comments are property of their posters.
 

About Us

"It's about Radio"

 

Copyright © 2017